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Abstract
This thesis investigates the causal impact of research and development as the driver
to the growth for a sample of 11 OECD countries over the period of 1980-2014. The
R&D-driven growth hypothesis is embedded within a calibrated dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model to be tested via Indirect Inference simulation-
based method of testing and evaluation; the method which relies on the comparison
between the features of the model-generated and actual data through the auxiliary
model. This method ensures the identification of the DSGE model hence there is
no ambiguity in defining the direction of the causation in the model which comes
from the R&D spending to productivity growth. The parameters of interest are also
estimated using ‘simulated annealing’ algorithm and the parameter-modified model
is tested by Indirect Inference Wald. The test results for the specified model satisfies
the non-rejection condition where the relevant statistic lies within the 95% confidence
interval. This thesis suggests an explicit empirical evidence that for the small open
economies of OECD, the R&D spendings as a proxy for innovative activities causes
a long-run growth episodes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A brief review of the literature on growth theories confirms significant developments
in the number of studies focused on determining the causes and welfare e↵ects of
growth in nation’s productivities. There are extensions to valid theories which de-
pict the association of productivity growth with a variety of economic, social and
political variables. Although there are extensive improvements in our understand-
ings of the growth matters during past few decades, the question of what truly causes
a sustainable growth is still a fresh progressive topic. Between all of the philosoph-
ical, societal and economic viewpoints about the growth, the new growth theories
have a significant role in explaining the di↵erent aspects of the issue.
Among these highly accepted theories with the economic growth as their focal
point, four direct extensions to Solow’s (1956) model are the most influential ones:
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt’s (1992)
R&D-driven model of endogenous growth and Jones (1995b) semi-endogenous growth
model with diminishing returns to knowledge of R&D are the examples of responses
to the shortcomings of Solow’s theory. Despite their di↵erences, these theories believe
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that the steady growth can be generated endogenously in a sense that it can occur
without any exogenous technical progress. Accordingly, the growth rates based on
these models may depend on preference and technology parameters and even activist
policies.
R&D-driven growth theories emphasise on the impact of innovative activities and
research expenses as the growth-enhancing elements. Based on these models the in-
novative activities will ensure a sustainable long-run growth. Hence, the positive
e↵ect of R&D on TFP growth is highly approved analytically; however, the mag-
nitude of the e↵ect and the direction of the identified causal relation between TFP
growth and R&D are still matters of empirical doubts. The controversy on the direc-
tion and magnitude of the e↵ect may raise a question of how e↵ective are the R&D
enhancing policies as mostly these policies are very expensive. As accurate as the
answer to this issue may be, the more e cient the implied policy decisions are.
One may ask if this hypothesis worth any further investigations. Despite the
fact that most of the theoretical and empirical studies on the relation between R&D
investment and TFP growth provide substantial evidence that these two factors are
positively related (see Scherer, 1982; Griliches, 1982; Aghion, 1992; Zachariadis,
2003), these theoretical frameworks have never been tested and their ability to be
empirically rejected has not been appropriately investigated. More importantly, not
so much systematic causal analysis has been performed on the relation between TFP
and R&D. Although in this case, one expects the causation to be bi-directional in
nature, this certainly needs to be tested. On the other hand, access to improved
data for research and development expenditures and more advanced computational
methods, make it vital to call up empirical models and raise the accuracy of their
results by inspecting them in more details.
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The structure of this thesis is as following. In Chapter 2, a literature review on
dominant endogenous growth models is given. The focus is on those endogenous
models with research and development as the primary driver; accordingly, some pros
and cons and improvements in the structure of these models are briefly noted. The
summary of the analytical studies confirms a positive marginal impact of R&D.
Following the literature of the analytical approaches, a brief overview of empirical
studies with the aim to find the rate of return to R&D is given which shows con-
troversial ideas for the magnitude and even the direction of the e↵ect of innovative
activities on TFP growth. This will raise questions about the empirical validation
of the analytical theories and if they are following the correct path in analysing the
specified determinants of growth. This is to motivate the growth model of Chapter
3 which is tested and estimated in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 3, a dynamic R&D-driven rational expectation model of endogenous
growth is proposed. A representative agent model of the open economy is depicted,
and the relations between aggregate macro variables are determined. This provides
a simple but an identified model of endogenous growth which isolate the e↵ect of
innovation (R&D expenditure as a proxy for innovation) to evaluate the possible
consequences of the relevant policies. Complications raised by augmenting a real
business cycle model to endogenize the growth factor of productivity in an open
economy make the simplification valid and defendable. Needless to say that this
model wants to reevaluate the e↵ectiveness of the highly accepted R&D on growth
through a panel study, hence simplifying the model assists the rather complicated
computational method described in Chapter 5. Subsequently, the model is calibrated
using the stylised facts of the growth and RBC literature, and the impulse response
functions of a one-o↵ shock to R&D factor are illustrated.
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The method of Indirect Inference as the methodology to evaluate and estimate
the outlined RBC growth model is discussed in Chapter 4. The progressive method
of Indirect Inference provides a classical statistical inferential framework for evalu-
ating a partially estimated or a calibrated model, such as the one under my study,
maintaining the spirit of the early methods of evaluation for RBC models. The
main characteristic of this approach is using an auxiliary model to frame the actual
data and model-generated data and compare these two frames to see if the model is
“true” in the spirit of Friedman’s positivism. Following Le and Meenagh (2013), the
process of estimation via simulated annealing method is adopted, and the choice of
panel VECM as the auxiliary model are described.
In the fifth chapter, the testing and estimation process described in Chapter 4 is
used to evaluate the R&D-driven RBC model calibrated in Chapter 3. Firstly the
data for the economic and science and technology indicators are introduced. The
choice of gross domestic research and development expenditure share in GDP to
proxy the innovation in the model is reasoned, and the details about the relation
between R&D intensity and TFP are given. Secondly, the baseline calibrated model
is tested, and the related Wald statistics are found and compared to the 5% critical
value. Thirdly, the model is estimated using a simulated annealing algorithm dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. This method is based on a search about 35-45% above or below
the initial calibration value for the parameters of interest and the model with a new
set of parameters found in the specified range will be tested. These adjustments
result in a model which certifies the positive e↵ect of innovation hence confirm the
necessity of a policy intervention to increase the growth-enhancing innovative activ-
ities.
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Chapter 2
R&D as the Driving Force of
Economic Growth : A Review of
the Literature
“It is however always important to remember that the ability to see things in their
correct perspective may be, and often is, divorced from the ability to reason correctly
and vice versa. That is why a man may be a very good theorist and yet talk absolute
nonsense....” -Joseph A. Schumpeter, 1943
2.1 Introduction
An overview of the literature reveals a notable growth in empirical and theoretical
studies on the sources and causes of growth in nations’ productivities. There are
varieties of studies depicting the association of productivity growth with so many
13
economic, social and political variables including many a↵ected by government poli-
cies, while there are analytical models which tend to focus more narrowly on some
specific sources of growth. Some of these e↵orts explain many of what Kaldor (1961)
refers to the “stylised facts” of economic growth.
The first approach of these analytical models such as Jones and Manuelli (1990),
Rebelo (1991) and King and Rebelo (1993) focuses on capital accumulation, broadly
defined to include human capital as the driving force of economic growth. The
second approach identifies the external economies as the driver for the growth in
meaning that firm’s investment in physical (inspired by Arrow’s (1962) paper) and
human capital (Lucas, 1988) contributes to the productivity of capital held by others.
The third approach believes that the evolution and adaptation of new ideas are the
channels to sustainable growth in productivity. The pioneers on the latter are Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Based on this
approach, the profit-motivated innovations resulted from research and development
lead to the accumulation of knowledge which becomes a primary source of growth.
It must be considered that the main feature of R&D driven-growth theories is their
explicit identification of a mechanism which ensures a long-term impact of policies
on growth.
Alongside these analytical works there is a majority of empirical studies attempts
to shed some light on the role of R&D as the proxy to innovative activities in en-
hancing TFP (proxy for growth), see the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) and
Sveikauskas (2007), as well as past issues of the OECD STI Review; for the UK,
see the report by Gri th et al. (2003), and for Canada, Longo (1984) and Mohnen
(1992a). One cannot claim the existence of a consensus on the size of the R&D
impact on growth or the direction of the e↵ect in past empirical works as the results
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are mixed and not always confirming the theoretical proposition. Many studies find
the marginal impact of R&D to be high and positive (see Hall and Mairesse, 1995;
Adams and Ja↵e, 1996) which is a confirmation for most of the theoretical works
and several other studies which are indicating that although investment in R&D in-
creases the knowledge accumulation of the society, the e↵ects on the level of growth
for representative firm can be insignificant or even negative (Link, 1981; Sassenou,
1989)- some firms may benefit from the increase in their R&D and some just su↵er
from the costs without experiencing the increase in their productivity.
The controversy on the e↵ect may raise a question of how important are the
R&D enhancing policies as mostly these policies are very expensive. In this thesis,
I propose a R&D-driven DSGE model of endogenous growth which is outlined in
Chapter 3. A panel data technique and data of 11-OECD countries for the period of
1980-2014 is used to investigate the following postulation of this endogenous growth
model: R&D investment as the proxy to the innovation leads to permanent increases
in TFP. This hypothesis is then tested and estimated using Indirect Inference method
(see Chapter 4).
One may ask the question that if this hypothesis worth any further investigations.
I shall answer it with a yes. Despite the fact that most of the theoretical and empirical
studies on the relation between R&D investment and TFP growth provide substantial
evidence that these two factors are positively related (see Scherer, 1982; Griliches
and Lichtenberg, 1984; Aghion and Howitte, 1998; and Zachariadis, 2003), these
theoretical frameworks have never been tested and their ability to be falsified has not
been appropriately investigated. More importantly, not so many systematic causality
analysis has been performed on the relation between TFP and R&D. Although one
may, in this case, expect the causation to be bi-directional in nature, this certainly
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needs to be tested. On the other hand, access to improved data for research and
development expenditures and patenting the innovations, make it vital to call up
empirical models and raise the accuracy of their results by inspecting them in more
details.
To motivate the R&D-driven growth model tested in Chapter 5, this chapter
provides a review of some existing literature on the question of study as well as
some historical facts about R&D intensity factor and the relevant policies for the 11-
OECD countries of the study. Unlike most of the related micro-level studies which
focusing on policies targeting particular firms, sectors or industries, in this thesis,
I look at aggregate impacts of innovation channel (here R&D expenditures) at the
macroeconomic level.
2.2 Theoretical Background of Economic Growth
“Economic growth, the process by which a nation’s wealth increases over time...in
the context of economic theory, it generally refers to an increase in wealth over an
extended period.” - Encyclopædia Britannica
2.2.1 Neoclassical vs. Endogenous Growth Analysis
Although the issue of economic growth received considerable attention directly af-
ter the second world war, there are more references to the economists’ concerns
about the growth-related issues even before that. Analysis of the process of growth
was a central feature of the work of the English classical economists, as represented
chiefly by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. The interest of these
economists on growth economy mostly rooted in the concrete conditions of their
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time. Live on the eve or in the full throes of the industrial revolution; they could
not help it but be impressed by the social and economic changes of the time. The
interest of these economists in economic growth was not just because of the time
but also a philosophical concern with the possibilities of “progress” - the necessary
conditions of developments of the material basis of society (Harris, 1975). It can
be felt that the purpose of their analyses was to identify the societal forces ensur-
ing these developments and consequently to provide a basis for policy and action to
influence growth-amplifying forces. Smith’s attack to monopolistic privileges asso-
ciated with mercantilism (1776)1, Malthus’s concern with population growth (1798)
2 and Ricardo’s campaign against the corn law in 1815 3 are examples of activi-
ties condemning policies which prevent the nation’s economic progress. Witnessing
the growth in inputs such as capital resulted in the growth of output, made these
economists, notably Smith, to determine the capital accumulation through deliber-
ate saving or what Smith mentioned as “parsimony”, as a fundamental driving force
behind economic growth. The question is,How long this capital accumulation is going
to last?
Continuous capital accumulation is the heart of the classical theory which is
systemised by John Stuart Mill (1854), and according to it any increase in capital
investment increases the labour demand, and in the absence of growth in the numbers
of workers, real wages rise which in return stimulate long-term population growth.
1Smith was not optimistic about the chances of Britain introducing free trade because of the outspoken
opposition and political power of the vested interests. He freely compared the protected manufacturing
interests to “an overgrown standing army” which would focus the ”insolent outrage of furious and disap-
pointed monopolists” which no politician would dare cross.
2“The superior power of population cannot be checked without producing misery or vice.”-Essay on the
Principle of Population(1798)
3In “Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock’ which he published in 1815,
he argued that raising the tari↵ on grain imports tended to increase the rents of the country gentlemen
while decreasing the profits of manufacturers.
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This then results in a growth in the number of the ‘mouths’ in the economy which
means a higher demand for consumer’s goods such as agricultural products; as them
characterised by decreasing returns to scale, and it raises the issues related to the
decline in marginal productivity of capital and fall of incentive to invest. Thus, in
classic economic growth theory, it is highly believed that a non-declining marginal
productivity of capital ends up to a sustained higher level of growth in the economy
if it happens.
In this sense, Solow’s (1956) neoclassical model of growth demonstrates that a
sustainable positive per capita growth in long-run is possible. Based on this theory
if labour is constant then technological progress can overcome the negative e↵ect of
diminishing rate of return on capital and hence deliver a sustained positive per capita
growth in a long-run where the per capita output grows at the same rate as the rate
of the technological progress. A contemporaneous study by Swan (1956) developed
a similar analysis with a less explicit mathematical structure 4.
Before Solow and Swan, seminal papers by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1947)
received extensive attention. They present that in a steady state of the economy
it is necessary that product of the saving-output ratio and the output-capital ratio
be equal to the rate of growth of potential output. In other words, if the output-
potential output ratio is to remain constant, capital; Kt and the potential output; Y¯
must grow at the same rate. They suggest that these three numbers; Kt, Y¯ and
Yt
Y¯
might be determined by di↵erent aspects of economic behaviour, hence it is unlikely
for the market economy to be able to ensure the satisfaction of this condition and
thus an active intervention of the government is required. On the other hand, Solow
(1956) assumed that the ratio of output to potential output is constant which was the
4see discussion of the “golden rule” condition in papers by Phelps (1961) and Solow (1962).
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matter of concern to Harrod and Domar. Solow observed that output-capital ratio
could adjust endogenously, but as Hahn (1987) has noted, this observation does not
actually speak to the Harrod-Domar problem.5
MacCallum (1996) defends Solow saying that although his contribution is not
a complete optimising model, but he and Swan developed “something that might
reasonably be called model”, in the sense of a “falsifiable depiction of some economic
phenomena”, whereas Harrod and Domar had only derived a condition for a steady
growth using a simple algebra which is required to be satisfied. He then continues
with outlining the reason why the Solow-Swan’s neoclassical approach fails to explain
even some basic economic facts about actual growth behaviour. MacCallum (1996)
believes that the failure is rooted in the scheme where the model predicts output
per person to approach a steady-state path along with it grows at a rate which is
exogenous to the model- the growth rate is independent of preferences, most aspects
of the production function and also policy variables. As a consequence, the model
suggests a constant growth rate for all economies or di↵erent values “about which it
has nothing to say” for the real world in which the nations have di↵erent per capita
growth rates, the rates that are systematically related to a variety of features of
the economies. Attempts to response to these and other failings stressed by Romer
(1986, 1987, 1989), Lucas (1988), King and Rebelo (1990) involved in the resurgence
of growth theory which is known as endogenous growth models. The general feature
of these ‘new growth’ theories is the presence of constant or increasing returns to
5“It will be noted straight away that [Solow’s] argument has no bearing on Harrod’s knife-edge claim.
Harrod had not proposed that warranted paths diverge from the steady state, but that actual path did. The
latter is neither characterised by a continual equality of ex-ante investment and savings nor by continual
equilibrium in the market for labour. Thus although Solow thought he was controverting the knife-edge
argument, he had only succeeded in establishing the convergence of warranted paths to the steady-state.”
(F.H. Hahn, 1987)
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factors that can be accumulated such as capital (Barro, 1990).
In endogenous growth models, steady growth can be generated endogenously in
the sense that it can occur without any exogenous technical progress. Accordingly,
the growth rates based on these strand of models may depend upon preference and
technology parameters and even activist policies. For the sake of clarity I relate
the new growth theories to three categories: endogenous growth models with per-
fect competition (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo,1991), endogenous growth with
imperfect competition which consists of two strands- models with horizontal prod-
uct di↵erentiation (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, ch.6) and models that assign economic growth to a vertical product
di↵erentiation (Segerstrom et al. 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and 1998; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, ch. 7) with both of them focused on the impact of R&D
on economic growth and finally semi-endogenous growth models (Jones, 1995b) and
Endogenous growth models without the scale e↵ects (Young, 1998).
In the following sections, I briefly overview these approaches to endogenous
growth.
2.2.2 Endogenous Growth Models with Perfect Competition
It is outlined in the previous section that the neoclassical theory of economic growth,
Solow-Swan (1956) model of endogenous growth- attributes the long-run growth of
output to the technological progress with a consideration that the level of technology
is taken to be an exogenously growing factor outside of the system.
This then brings up a question: Why Solow and others (Cass, 1965; Koopmans,
1965) made this assumption? One answer to this question may be that models of
perfect competition are the simplest existing models of firm behaviour with easy-
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to-understand implications, but these strand of models require constant returns to
scale, in better words, the sum of the factor payments exhausts all the output as
Euler equation says
Yt = K.
@Yt
@Kt
+N.
@Yt
@Nt
(2.1)
hence, the perfectly competitive firm has nothing left with which it can finance ba-
sic research, invent patentable technologies or do anything other than only paying
capital rent and ensuring the payroll of production workers. According to this fact,
the firm is not capable of financing the growth-enhancing activities; therefore, the
only alternative is to assume the technological progress to occur exogenously. Paul
Romer’s (1986) with his famous paper, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”,
led the way to the formulation of the new generation of models with accumulated
knowledge as the driver of the growth. Romer sketched his knowledge-based endoge-
nous growth as following, firm j’s production function, j = {1, ..., J} is the number
of representative firms, presented as
yj,t = AtF (kj,t, nj,t) (2.2)
where kj,t and nj,t are capital and labour inputs for the firm j respectively. At is the
aggregate output-augmenting technological progress. It is assumed that the capital
of the firm accumulates without depreciation.
˙kj,t = ij,t (2.3)
with the assumption that there is no population growth and considering individuals
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are distributed along the unit interval, aggregate investment is
It =
Z 1
0
ij,tdj (2.4)
the most important assumption in Romer’s (1986) model is that the aggregate stock
of knowledge in the economy is proportional to the cumulative sum of past aggregate
investment, which is identical to the size of the aggregate capital
⌅t =
Z t
 1
Ivdv = Kt (2.5)
then he determines productivity via the e↵ect of the stock of knowledge, At = ⌅
 
t ,
where  < 1. Accordingly the firm level Cobb-Douglas production function will be
yj,t = k
↵
j,tn
1 ↵
j,t ⌅
 
t (2.6)
which is a constant return to scale (CRS) model of production in (kt, nt) at the firm
level where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, ↵, is between
zero and unity and aggregate knowledge, ⌅t, is fixed. Therefore the aggregate level
output is
Yt = K
↵
t N
1 ↵
t ⌅
 
t (2.7)
Romer assumes the representative household maximises a typical CRRA6 utility
function and ignores the trivial e↵ect her own investment decision has on aggregate
6The consumer maximises the discounted sum of Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function
u(c) =Max
Z 1
0
[(
1
1  ⇢ )(
ct
nt
)1 ⇢]e ⌫tdt
where per capita consumption, ( ctnt ) is assumed to be ct, ⇢ measures the degree of relative risk aversion
which is implicit in the utility function and ⌫ is the time preference.
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knowledge. Hence by using the marginal product of capital, ↵k↵ 1j,t n
1 ↵
i,t ⌅
 
t , and
normalising the model by assuming that the aggregate quantity of labour adds up
to Nt = 1, one can set up and solve the Hamiltonian to obtain
c˙j,t
cj,t
=
↵k↵ 1j,t ⌅
 
t   ⌫
⇢
(2.8)
if households are homogenous and the condition ⌅t = Kt is satisfied, the aggregate
consumption per capita evolves according to
c˙t
ct
=
↵k↵ 1t ⌅
 
t   ⌫
⇢
(2.9)
=
↵k↵+  1t   ⌫
⇢
(2.10)
the economy can have a balanced growth path if ↵ +  = 1 and there will be a
constant growth forever at a rate that depends on the degree of impatience and
capital’s share in output.
c˙t
ct
=
↵  ⌫
⇢
(2.11)
Romer’s (1986) approach is consistent with both learning-by-doing, where learn-
ing is measured by cumulative investments and investment in research and devel-
opment. Thus, this model can be related to Arrow’s (1962) theory of technological
change due to learning by doing, which assumes that the labor e ciency depends on
capital stock but instead of assuming diminishing returns to learning, takes learning
to be proportional to capital stock with the additional di↵erence that here the capital-
labour ratio measures the learning rather than the total capital. In Romer’s analysis,
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the knowledge accumulation is an accidental byproduct of the investment decisions of
representative firm. In a word, capital accumulation generates intra-firm knowledge
accumulation through learning-by-doing, and it can spill over to other firms which
provide an increasing return to scale which constitutes a type of positive externality.
The spillover mechanism here ensures the perfect competition in endogenous growth,
although the resulting equilibrium of spillover e↵ect is sub-optimal. Hence, the social
planner takes into account the fact that in the existence of externalities, there is a
higher return to capital accumulation at the social level than at the individual level.
The steady state chosen by the social planner is
c˙t
ct
=
↵ +    ⌫
⇢
(2.12)
Equation (2.12) implies that the steady-state growth rate depends upon ↵,  , ⌫
and ⇢. It can be concluded that the capital accumulation should be subsidised if
the social planner wants to induce the private economy to move toward the social
optimum which justifies the government intervention.
The second of the two basic endogenously driven growth mechanisms involves
the accumulation of ‘human capital’7 in the sense that labour force’s skills will be
enhanced by the adequate investment of valuable resources on them. Lucas (1988)
presents a human capital driven endogenous growth in which output is generated via
a production function of the form
Yt = AtK
↵
t
 
`HtNt
 1 ↵
(2.13)
7Human capital is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the skills the labour force possesses and
is regarded as a resource or asset.” It encompasses the notion that there are investments in people (e.g.
education, training, health, etc...) and that these investments increase an individual’s productivity.
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where ` is defined as the proportion of total labor time spent working 8 and Ht is the
stock of human capital. Rewriting equation (2.13) in per capita terms gives a CRS
production function as
yt = Atk
↵
t
 
`ht
 1 ↵
(2.14)
Capital accumulation proceeds via the usual di↵erential equation
k˙t = yt   ct   (+  )kt (2.15)
while ht evolves according to
h˙t =  ht(1  `) (2.16)
hence
h˙t
ht
=  (1  `) (2.17)
where   is the parameter that determines the e ciency of human capital accumula-
tion. In Lucas’s (1988) paper, he does not examine the Solow version of the model
with a constant saving rate but instead he considers the version in which a social
planner solves for the optimal perfect foresight paths of kt and ht. I will not go
through the math here (as it is out of the scope of this literature review), I will just
8In Chapter 3, I use Lucas’s approach on the time division between activities and I chose the notation
` for the time spend on leisurely activities and N for the time spend on normal wage-earning activities.
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present the conclusion. The steady-state growth rate is
c˙t
ct
=
   ⌫
⇢
(2.18)
Lucas also solves a version of the model with externality to human capital included.
The idea is that each individual’s productivity is enhanced if they are surrounded
by those with a high level of human capital. Thus, the production function in this
specific version is given as
yj,t = Atk
↵
j,t
 
`jhj,t
 1 ↵
h¯ (2.19)
here h¯ is the average human capital in the population and relative to it  determines
externality in this model. Hence, the steady-state growth rate of human capital for
the representative consumer will be
 h =
⇢ 1(   ⌫)n
1 +
 (1  ⇢ 1)
1  ↵
o (2.20)
Following the consumer’s homogeneity assumption, the derived growth rate of aggre-
gate human capital (and the growth rate of all the rests) is the same for all individu-
als. If there were no externalities to a↵ect the growth,  = 0, equation (2.18) would
be the solution. Since saving is the source of growth in endogenous growth models,
in the existence of the externality, the solution depends on the value for ⇢ 1 being
equal, greater or less than unity. The h¯ externality is like an increase in the interest
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rate; thus it’s e↵ect is determined by the trade-o↵s between income and substitution
e↵ects. If ⇢ = 1 the income e↵ect exactly o↵sets the substitution e↵ect and leaves the
consumption unchanged in response to changes in h¯ and (2.20) collapses to (2.18),
but in a situation where consumers are very willing to cut current consumption in
exchange for higher future consumption, ⇢ 1 > 1, the externality enhances saving
and therefore growth, otherwise, the income e↵ect outweighs the substitution e↵ect,
makes saving to fall and growth will be slower. Continuing his model, Lucas shows
that this decentralised solution is sub-optimal since representative consumer does
not obtain the full benefits to society of increasing their own stock of knowledge. In-
vestment of more time on human capital-enhancing activities and accumulating hj,t,
individuals increase h¯, which benefits the society in addition to themselves. Based on
these features, Lucas shows that to obtain the socially optimal solution, the economy
requires more of “the good thing” and increases the investment in human capital.
The di↵erence between Romer and Lucas’s theories is that in Romer (1986) the
growth is caused by accumulating technology (or knowledge) and human capital is
only seen as knowledge and ideas (in his later paper, Romer (1990) considers these
‘ideas’, non-rival and partly excludable) but in Lucas’s approach it is the human cap-
ital formation itself which drives the endogenous growth via non-decreasing marginal
returns. In both models, to get the benefits of positive externality and ensure the
competitive optimal market solution, the role of a centralised social planner is em-
phasised. Thus, choosing any of the two human capital or accumulated knowledge
as the channel of growth makes it inevitable for policy authorities to intervene in the
market-based economy to push the society to the optimal level.
Rebelo (1990) proposes a similar class of economies with Romer (1986) sharing
the property that growth is endogenous and increases in productivity attributed
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to technical progress in the neoclassical growth model. It is the simplest possible
endogenous growth model, AK, where the production function is assumed to be linear
in the only input, capital, and it rules out the labour income by assumption. Taking
the taxation of income to account, it is shown that the public policy of increasing
the income tax substantially reduces growth rates. The main di↵erence between
Rebelo (1990) and Romer (1986) is that Rebelo’s model describes a constant returns
to scale technologies which are compatible with the stylised facts of economic growth
described in Kaldor (1961). Following Romer’s paper, the competitive equilibrium in
Rebelo’s model is under the perfect foresight, and it can be computed as a solution
to a planning problem considering the fact that in the absence of distortion the
equilibrium is Pareto optimum. Although having much shared with Romer’s model,
Rebelo concludes that the increasing returns9 and externalities are not necessary to
generate endogenous growth. He then emphasises on the fact that as long as there is
a “core” of capital goods whose production does not involve non-reproducible factors,
endogenous growth will be consistent with the constant return to scale economies.
Three models described in section (2.2.1) allow public policies to a↵ect the long-
run growth rate through channels of human capital, externalities and direct inter-
vention as taxation. This strand of endogenous growth model considers a typical
Walrasian equilibrium wherein the absence of any shocks to the system the model
generates a Pareto optimal solution. Section (2.2.2) outlines the literature on models
with imperfect competition which are known as R&D-based endogenous growth.
.
9Romer(1990) worked on a consistent increasing rate of return.
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2.2.3 Endogenous Growth Models with Imperfect Competition
According to Hornung (2002), R&D-based endogenous growth models consist of two
major types: models comprise horizontal product di↵erentiation (i.e. expanding
product’s variety) such as Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 3),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 6) and also the type which encompasses models
that assign economic growth to vertical product di↵erentiation (i.e. improving prod-
uct quality) studied by Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,
1991b), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 7) and Aghion
and Howitt (1998, ch. 3). Throughout both, the growth models are based on R&D-
capturing the imperfect competition e↵ect through the R&D marginal e↵ect on en-
dogenously driven growth in which the pace of the long-run sustainable growth is
determined by the number of the researchers and scientists and in general case the
research and development expenditures, hence subsidising the research and develop-
ment activities will unambiguously and positively a↵ects total factor productivity.
Romer’s (1990) seminal paper provides a general idea about the first-generation
of R&D-based endogenous growth structure. This model has four variables; output,
Yt, capital, Kt, labour, Nt and knowledge (the terms technology or ideas can also
be used), At. The simplest model of R&D-based endogenous growth has two sec-
tors (later developments in Romer-type models consist an intermediate goods sector
too); a final goods sector and R&D sector which produce final goods and knowledge
respectively. Now the allocation of the labour should be considered; here it is as-
sumed that part of labour allocate their time on producing final goods and the rest
are producing knowledge (scientists and innovators); hence, the economy as a total
has the labour endowment of NY,t + NA,t = Nt. Now a Cobb-Douglas Production
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function for output is assumed
Yt = K
↵
t (AtNt)
1 ↵ (2.21)
with 0 < ↵ < 1 as the marginal elasticity of substitution of inputs. The important
part of these models is the “new ideas” production function which happens in the
R&D sector by assumption.
A˙t =  ¯ANA,t (2.22)
where A˙t represents the flow of new knowledge or the number of new ideas gener-
ated by the scientists in R&D sector,  ¯A is the average research productivity having
following structure
 ¯A =  AA
 A
t N
  1
A,t (2.23)
where  A > 0,  A, and  A are constant parameters, At 1 is the existing stock of
knowledge at time t, and A At intended to capture the e↵ect of stock of knowledge
10 on the current research productivity. Equation (2.23) presents that any increase
in the stock of knowledge may increase the present current research productivity,
hence  A > 0 will be the positive “spillover of knowledge” to future researchers, and
it is referred to “standing on the shoulder” e↵ect in literature. It is also possible
for e↵ect to be negative,  A < 0, which means discovering new ideas becomes more
di cult during the time as most of the original distinct ideas are already found- it
is called “fishing out e↵ect”. The situation where  A = 0 is referred to a time when
standing on the shoulder completely o↵sets the negative e↵ects of fishing out; thus
10The knowledge stock can simply be identified as the accumulation of all ideas already been discovered
by scientists or developed by inventors.
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current research productivity becomes independent of the knowledge stock. One
may question the presence of N  1A,t in equation (2.23). This captures the e↵ect of
the number of labour contributing in discovering or developing new ideas on the
research productivity at time t. It is probable that by increasing the number of
workers allocating their time on research and development, increases in the frequency
of duplication or overlapping of discoveries happen. In that case, by doubling the
number of researchers, NA,t, the number of unique ideas, A˙t is less than double of
“stepping on toes” e↵ect which can be captured by allowing 0 <   < 1. Combining
(2.22) and (2.23) gives
A˙t =  AN
 
A,tA
 A
t (2.24)
Equation (2.24) suggests that any growth in the number of new ideas at any given
point in time depends on the number of researchers and the existing stock of knowl-
edge. Given the above set up the balanced growth path will be
gY = gK = gA (2.25)
where gY , gK and gA are the steady state growth of output, capital and technology
respectively. Hence, R&D-based endogenous growth shares the same prediction as
the neoclassical Solow model. Romer (1990) imposes restrictions,  A = 1 and   = 1
to equation (2.24), where the first restriction makes A˙t linear in At hence generates
growth in the stock of knowledge as
A˙t
At
=  ANA,t (2.26)
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and the steady state of the growth rate of the stock of knowledge , gA will be
gA =  ANA (2.27)
(2.27) shows the steady state growth rate of the knowledge stock and according to
(2.25) the steady state of per capita output depends positively on the number of
researchers work in R&D sector. This proportionality of the size of the population
and the growth rate is called “scale-e↵ects” property which characterises most of the
first-generation R&D-based endogenous growth models. Being based on imperfect
competition in R&D, Romer’s analysis has important policy implications: policies
which encourage more researchers to devote their time to innovative activities (i.e.
subsidising R&D sector) have a permanent long-run growth-enhancing impact on
the economy. Romer’s (1990) original paper uses the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of
product variety assuming new products are no better than existing ones, and there
is no uncertainty involved in the structure. This is the hallmark of Romer (1990) in
a nutshell and many Romer’s style R&D-based growth models, including Grossman
and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), follow similar princi-
ples in explaining the growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) construct a
model of vertical innovation which implicitly integrates the analysis of Segerstrom,
Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) establish a simple
Schumpeterian-style11 growth, modelling the innovation process similar to patent-
race literature surveyed by Tirol (1988, ch. 10) and Reinganum (1989). I briefly
discuss Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) model as it is more significant of all the similar
11Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998, ch. 3) embody Schumpeter’s idea of ”creative destruction.” Each
innovative activity is the act of creation whose goal is to capture the monopoly rents, but it also destroys
the monopoly rents which motivated the previous creation.
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models recalled in this section. The structure of Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) model
is as following. There assumed a three-section economy with a perfectly competitive
final good’s (manufacturing) sector, a monopolistic sector in charge of producing a
single intermediate good and finally a R&D sector comprised of many identical re-
searchers. Similar to Romer (1990) the allocation of labour across the sectors is the
matter of interest here; labour divided into those who allocate their time producing a
single monopolistic intermediate good, x, and those who devotes their time (labours)
to research and development, n. It is assumed that the final good’s sector produces
goods using an intermediate input purchased from a monopolistic supplier.
y = Ax↵ (2.28)
where 0 < ↵ < 1 and A measures the stock of technological progress. In this
model, an innovation raises A by a constant factor like  . Hence, consider t indexes
innovation (and not time in Aghion and Howitt, 1992), At+1At =  . It must be noted
that innovations consist of creating new varieties of intermediate goods that replace
the old ones, and whose use increases the productivity of the intermediate goods in
the production of final goods. Considering the price of intermediate input to be p,
the firm will maximise its own profit
⇧ = Ax↵   px (2.29)
from (2.29), the price of the intermediate input can be derived as p = ↵Ax↵ 1 which
implies that final goods producers employ x until its marginal product equals its
price. Similar to Romer’s model, Aghion and Howitt’s has two positive spillovers
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such as the monopoly rent of the firm is lower than the consumer surplus generated
by intermediate output and also because the result of the innovative activities are
accessible, the researchers can “stand on the shoulder’s of inventors by using their
innovative ideas and move on to the next invention (partially non-excludable good).
There is also the negative externality of “business stealing e↵ect” which indicates
the e↵ect of successful monopolist destroying the previous by making its invention
‘obsolete’. Note that the incentive for innovators in this model is the opportunity
to get the monopolistic rent, in that case let Vt+1 denotes the expected discounted
payo↵ to the innovation, hence  Vt+1 will be the gross income of any innovators in
the absence of the new rivals, where   is the productivity of the research technology.
Therefore the net expected profit of this new innovation is
⇡ =  nVt+1   wtn (2.30)
with n indicates the number of hours or labour devoting themselves to the research
and wt is the wage rate after innovation t. Free entry into the research sector ensures
that (2.30) is equal to zero giving; wt =  Vt+1 which states that the expected value
of one unit of devoted research equals to its costs (no-arbitrage condition). Vt+1 is
determined by
Vt+1 =
⇡t+1
r +  nt+1
(2.31)
Here ⇡t+1 is the profit flow attainable by the (t + 1) intermediate goods and the
denominator can be interpreted as “obsolescence-adjusted interest rate” presenting
the creative destruction e↵ect in the sense that the more research is expected to
happen after the current innovation, and the more productive the research is, the
shorter will be the duration of the life of monopoly profits enjoyed by the creator
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of the next innovation, hence the smaller payo↵ to the innovation. Recalling Romer
model, innovations become more valuable over time (complementarities) whereas
here they become less valuable (obsolescence). To go further, the profit maximisation
problem of the successful innovator is solved. It is out of the scope of this literature
work to go through all algebraic steps hence some steps are ignored. To have more
information on the details see Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 3).
First order conditions are
x =
⇣↵2At
wt
⌘ 1
1 ↵
= x˜
⇣wt
At
⌘
(2.32)
x˜ expresses employment in manufacturing as a function of productivity adjusted
wage, wtAt which will be denoted as wt from now on. Equation (2.32) shows that when
the productivity adjusted wage rises, employment in manufacturing decreases.
⇡˜ =
⇣1  ↵
↵
⌘
wtx˜ (2.33)
profit is a function of employment in manufacturing and productivity adjusted wage
where it is decreasing in the latter. Combining no-arbitrage condition with equation
(2.31), it can be written
w =
  ⇡˜(wt+1)
r +  nt+1
(2.34)
equation (2.34) combined with the constraint of {xt + nt = Lt}, give multiple solu-
tions to this system of equations where these di↵erent solutions are associated with
di↵erent equilibria in the model and average growth rate will be a step-function in
which actual growth is a random function of time. The system can be solved for the
unique wˆ and nˆ where the system is at the steady state hence wt and nt are constant.
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Aghion and Howitt (1992) presents that the average growth rate along the balanced
growth path is
gˆ =  (nˆ) ln   (2.35)
hence, increases in the arrival parameter, the size of the skilled labor endowment,
the size of the innovations all raise the average growth rate in this model. Notice
that this model is also characterised by scale-e↵ects property as rises in population
will increase nˆ and therefore increases gˆ. The model outlined above can gain richness
and realism if there were introduced some sort of capital (physical, human or R&D
capital) that a↵ects the arrival rate of innovations, and as Aghion and Howitt note
in their seminal paper one of the advantages of this model is it’s simplicity which
makes it feasible to extend it further.
The scale-e↵ect prediction of the first-generation growth models is at odds with
the empirical outcomes of Jones (1995b). Hence a new literature has been developing
around the objective of eliminating this scale-e↵ect from the R&D-based growth
models. In next section Jones’(1995a, 1995b ) criticism to the scale-e↵ects property
of the R&D-based model is discussed, the alternative approach of a semi-endogenous
growth is outlined, and finally, a fully-endogenous Schumpeterian model of growth
is introduced.
2.2.4 Endogenous vs. Semi-endogenous Growth
Jones (1995a) argues that the “scale e↵ects” prediction of the R&D-based endoge-
nous models developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992) are inconsistent with the time series evidence from industrialised
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economies. He uses the number of the scientists and engineers to proxy the labour
population in R&D sector and total factor productivity (TFP) for growth in pro-
ductivity. The data is for the United States over the post-war period. He presents
that the prediction of the R&D-based model about the growth rate of the economy
being proportional to the size of its labour force is “easily falsifies”. Historical data
over 25 years show that the size of the labour force has grown dramatically, but the
growth rate is constant or even declining over the period. Figure 2.1 presents that
the amount of labour engaged in R&D increases by more than five times from about
160,000 in 1950 to nearly a million by 1988- same pattern for Japan, France and
West Germany. As it is depicted in Jones (1995a) the average growth of TFP for
the post-war period is relatively constant or even declining at some points.
37
Figure 2.1: Scientists and engineers engaged in R&D. Other S&E is the
sum of scientists and engineers in Japan, West Germany and France.
Source: Jones (1995a).
Hence, he concluded that the assumption embedded in R&D-based growth model
of first-generation that is the growth rate of the economy is proportional to the level
of resources allocated to research and development is falsified. Jones (1995b) is an
attempt to modify Romer (1990) specification to get a structure more consistent with
the time series evidence. To establish a brief review of Jones (1995b) adjusted model,
review Romer’s (1990) model discussed in section (2.23). Jones relaxes Romer’s
assumption of the knowledge spillovers being greater than unity. He believes that
Romer’s value for  A is ‘arbitrary’. By rearranging equation (2.24) and dividing it
by At, he derives
A˙t
At
=  A
n N A,t
A1  At
o
(2.36)
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meaning in the steady state, the growth rate of At is constant by definition; therefore,
the RHS of equation (2.36) is constant which indicates that NA,t and A
1  A
t must
grow at the same rate.
 
 N˙A,t
NA,t
 
= (1   A)A˙t
At
(2.37)
hence a constant steady state growth rate of At is consistent with a rising number of
scientists and researchers, NA,t if the condition of  A < 1 is satisfied. Imposing this
constraint eliminates the scale e↵ects assumed in first-generation R&D-based growth
models, thus
gA =
 
1   A
 N˙A,t
NA,t
 
(2.38)
that is the long-run growth rate of the stock of knowledge (according to equation
(2.25), this equals the long-run growth rate of per capita output) depends on the
growth rate of the labour force engaged in R&D rather than its level. Note that the
positive knowledge spillovers are not ruled out. The parameter capturing the spillover
e↵ects,  A is still strictly positive. Jones argues that the degree of positive knowledge
spillovers assumed by Romer (1990) is arbitrary and to achieve the consistency with
the historical evidence a weaker magnitude for this parameter is required. Along the
balanced growth path, the rate of growth in the number of scientists and engineers
equals the rate of growth in the labour force, N˙A,tNA,t =
N˙t
Nt
= n, hence
gA =
 
1   An (2.39)
this implies that a long-run growth depends upon the value of parameters  A, 
and n which are assumed to be exogenous to the model, hence, on the contrary to
Romer (1990), Helpman and Grossman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), in
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Jones’ (1995b) model, the long-run growth is independent of policy variables and the
channel of subsidy to R&D changes the long-run level of stock of knowledge but it
does not alter the long-run growth rate, this growth is invariant to policy variable.
This type of models in which the technological change is endogenous but the long-
run growth is pinned down by an exogenous population growth is known as semi-
endogenous growth. Following Jones’ (1995b) semi-endogenous growth structure,
Eaton and Kortum (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Segerstrom (1998),
Giordani and Luca (2008) assume similar characteristics for the growth model.
The second-generation of endogenous growth theories consist of another class of
models called ‘fully endogenous’ growth models following Aghion and Howitt (1998,
ch. 12), Howitt (2000), Peretto (1998) and Young (1993). These models retain
the assumption of constant returns to knowledge stock from the first-generation
of growth models before Jones (1995a) critique. Thus, on the contrast to semi-
endogenous growth theory, long-run policy implications of the first-generation models
are applicable. One of the major assumptions here is that the e↵ectiveness of R&D
is diluted due to the products proliferation (Ha and Howitt, 2007) as the economy
expands. In other words, it is required to increase R&D over time to o↵set the
negative e↵ect of increasing range and complexity of products which weaken the
positive productivity e↵ects of research and development activities.
Using notation in Ha and Howitt (2007), and Madsen (2008) a simple model of
Schumpeterian scale-free endogenous growth model is structured as following
A˙t
At
=  
  x
Q
  
A  1t (2.40)
where x is the innovative activities divided by the product variety, Q. The practi-
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cal result of Q in this models is that it eliminates the scale-e↵ects property of the
first-generation models.   is the duplication parameter- it will be 0 if the innovation
is duplication, 1 otherwise- which is assumed to equal unity in Ha and Howitt (2007).
Q / L  (2.41)
Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 12) and Ha and Howitt (2007) define   as product
proliferation, and  A is the return to scale to knowledge parameter. The values for
these two parameters will distinguish the endogenous growth models. In the absence
of product proliferation e↵ects,   = 0, the first-generation models assume a constant
returns to scale to the stock of knowledge,  A = 1, where semi-endogenous growth
models assume diminishing returns to knowledge,  A < 1. Fully-endogenous models
maintain the constant returns to scale property of the first-generation models but
assuming there are product proliferation e↵ects in the model,   = 1.
An interpretation of this trend of models is that as the population grows during
the time, there will be an increase in the number of innovators entering the market
with a new variety of product hence more horizontal innovations. This dilutes re-
source spendings on R&D over a larger number of separate projects. The restriction
  = 1 indicates the idea that in the long-run innovative activities and product variety
grow at the same rate; hence the growth-enhancing e↵ect of R&D is counterbalanced
by the negative e↵ect of the increasing in product variety (Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son, 1998). Jones (1999) criticises the assumption   = 1 in fully-endogenous models
as being a ”knife-edge” assumption and claims that by relaxing this assumption the
growth model is not fully endogenous anymore since the scale e↵ects are not elim-
inated. He then proposes a “hybrid” semi-endogenous model with partial product
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proliferation,   = 1, and diminishing returns to knowledge,  A < 1 which predicts
the scale e↵ect.
Peretto & Smulders (2002) is a response to Jones (1999) critique. They establish
a model in which the scale e↵ects may be positive or negative, but they always are
eliminated asymptotically. The claim that the value   = 1 is not just an assumed
parameter restriction but is a result of very specific microeconomic mechanisms in
the knowledge externalities.
There is still debate about which of these two styles of growth models are more
empirically correct, hence there is not enough for consensus on the matter. The
are scores of empirical economists who test and compare the outcomes of these two
strands of models to capture the real e↵ect of R&D channel on growth and test the
validity of policy implications, i.e. testing if subsidising R&D is growth-enhancing
or just a significant cost imposed on the system. Section (2.3) discusses an overview
of the empirical literature focused on testing and estimating the impact of R&D on
growth using di↵erent approaches.
2.3 Empirical Literature on the Rate of Return to R&D
The empirical studies concerned with the e↵ect of research and development on
growth generally involve testing or estimating the e↵ect of R&D variables on to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) growth. In section (2.2.4), I briefly discussed Jones’
(1995b) approach to the e↵ect of R&D on growth. By using the data for TFP growth
and R&D which is proxied by the number of scientists and engineers f Germany,
France, Japan and United States; Jones tests the validity of R&D-based endogenous
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growth models and he finds no evidence to support the positive impact of R&D
on TFP growth which has been emphasized by these models. Aghion and Howitt
(1998) provide explanations for this contradiction which is known as “Jones’ Para-
dox”. One of the reasons they discuss is the need for continuity in raising the R&D
over time to keep the innovation rate constant for each product, and the second
cause of this paradoxical result of Jones might be that by increasing the number of
outputs, the proportional spillover-e↵ect on the aggregate stock of knowledge will be
smaller. They also argue that instead of using the number of scientists and engineers
to proxy R&D, the GDP share of R&D investment should be used. Using these facts,
Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Zachariadis (2003) provide strong evidence that in
the U.S. economy R&D investment and TFP growth are positively related.
The literature on the estimation of the rate of return to R&D is divided into
two major groups: 1) the literature on the estimation of the private returns and
2) the social returns to R&D where it received substantial attention with the rec-
ommendations of Edwin Mansfield (1971) to the National Science Foundation on
topics in R&D which needs further investments. Within each of these two groups,
cross-section analysis and panel data studies are recognisable. Frantzen (2000), Grif-
fith (2000), and Gri th, Redding and Reenen (2004) use international panel data
and confirm a positive relationship between countries’ own R&D and productivity
growth. Coe, Helpman and Ho↵maister (1995); Gri th, Redding and Reenen (2002)
also present substantial evidence that R&D spillovers from industrialised countries
to developing countries have positive e↵ects on the TFP growth of the latter. About
R&D investments, Savvides and Zachariadis (2003) discuss the e↵ect of both domes-
tic and foreign direct R&D investment increase the domestic total factor productivity
growth. And Zachariadis in his paper in 2003, compares the R&D e↵ect on aggregate
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and manufacturing output and concludes that the R&D e↵ect is much higher for the
aggregate economy than the manufacturing sector.
These are just a few examples of the empirical studies attempt to estimate and
evaluate the impact of R&D on the growth of total factor productivity. Have it in
mind that there is an extensive literature which analyses this matter from di↵erent
angles using various methods, therefore in this literature review, I go through only
those few relevant studies which might help to clarify some aspects of the model
outlined in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 Private vs. Social Rate of Return to R&D
The empirical literature on the rate of return to research and developments shows a
constant attempt of economists in developing the method of estimating the impact
of R&D in the knowledge-based economy. Most of these studies augment the con-
ventional growth accounting framework with measures of R&D investment or capital
at firm, sector, industry or all the way up at aggregate-macro level. By regressing
TFP growth on the common production factors, i.e. capital, labour or intermediate
inputs, the residuals growth factor is assumed to be the product of R&D that may be
the growth-enhancing element. R&D can increase the productivity in various ways
such as increasing the productivity by improving the quality, reducing the cost of
producing it or it widens the spectrum of final goods or intermediate inputs. Hence,
R&D a↵ects the system by increasing the profit, reducing the prices or/and reallo-
cating factors across the appropriate level. One more important channel with which
R&D spendings may increase the growth is via knowledge spillovers; R&D carried
out in one firm, sector, industry or country may increase the productivity in other
firms, sectors, industries, or countries.
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Hence, if one must summarise the findings of the related literature on the impact
of R&D investment on growth, she may find it appropriate to divide them into two
groups: first group concentrates on estimating private rate of return to research and
development which received lots of attention since Mansfield (1971) and Griliches
(1973) and the second group estimates the social rate of return believing that the
social rate of return to R&D is much higher than the private rate i.e. Sveikauses
(1981) estimates a social rate of return to R&D of 50%, while Griliches and Licht-
enberg (1984) estimate a social rate of return to R&D of 41-62% where the private
rate is about 7-10%.
The private rate of return can just be estimated by looking at the e↵ect of the
firm’s own R&D on its own output. The most common way according to Gri th
(2000) to obtain the estimates of the rate of return to R&D is from the parameters
of the production function, hence with a production function of the general form
Yi,t = Ai,tF (Ki,t, Ni,t), total factor productivity will be a↵ected by many elements
which the stock of knowledge, G, is considered to be one of them
lnAi,t = ⌘A lnGi,t +   lnXi,t (2.42)
where Xi,t denotes all other factors a↵ecting the TFP.
⌘A =
⇣ @Yi,t
@Gi,t
⌘⇣Gi,t
Yi,t
⌘
(2.43)
The parameter ⌘A is the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge stock and
Gi,t
Yi,t
can be defined as R&D intensity12. rA =
@Yi,t
Gi,t
on the other hand is the rate of
12“R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP) is used as an indicator of an economy’s
relative degree of investment in generating new knowledge”.
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return to the accumulation of the knowledge which can proxy by R&D expenditure,
the flow of investment in knowledge. In principle, the choice between estimating an
elasticity or a rate of return depends on which one of the two is more likely to be
constant. Hall (1996) reports estimates to private rates of return to R&D which
cluster around 10-15%, however, it can be as high as 30% in some studies. Wieser
(2005) surveys 50 studies of the private rate of return to R&D and finds that about
50% of the studies so far report statistically significant estimate such as annual rates
of return in a range between 7% to 69% with an average value of 28.8%. It should
be noted that there are di↵erences between the estimated returns extracted from
cross section data, time series and panel data as Wieser (2005) reports the highest
rates belong to cross-section studies and the lowest to time series analysis with panel
data-based studies have an estimated value in between these two values.
The social rate of return to R&D is obtained by estimating the impact on growth
in one firm of R&D done in other firms. These other firms can be in a same indus-
try/country or in a di↵erent but related industry/country (Gri th et al. 2004). The
dominant belief is the higher social rate of return to R&D relative to the private rates.
The reason behind this is the idea that knowledge spills over from the innovator to
other firms. Hence, when a new idea is discovered, it can be imitated by others
(the properties of non-rivalry and only partial-excludability of knowledge make it
happens), although the innovator can have a share of the rent for her new idea with
the patent protection and the delay in distribution of the new idea between others.
To interpret the social rate of returns one must consider that estimation results at
the firm level capture the social return to that firm; hence those estimations at the
industry level captures the social rates of return to that industry but not spillovers
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (2011)
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to the other industries. Similarly, estimates conducted at national level presents the
social rate of return to R&D within the country but not those between the countries.
Jones and Williams (1998) present social rates of return which are integrated into
a macroeconomic model of endogenous innovation and growth. In their survey they
show that the social rates of return to research and development in literature are
under-evaluated, and the results of most studies in the literature provide only the
lower bound to the true social rate of return, once we take into account the dynamic
general equilibrium e↵ects emphasised in the endogenous growth literature, see table
(2.1).
Unfortunately, there are not many good quality studies which estimate the pri-
vate rate of return to R&D at the national level. But there are some studies which
calculate the social rate of return at the national level. Gri th (2000) and Gri th,
Redding and Van Reenen (2000) are examples of those studies. They use the value
of average relative TFP to calculate the implied total rate of return to R&D and
consider a non-zero imitation cost which is ignored by Jones and William (1998).
Hence Gri th et al. (2000) assume two channels which a↵ect productivity at the
national level, one is the innovation, and the other is the channel of increased po-
tential for imitation. The imitation factor is more crucial for those countries which
are behind the technological frontier. Accordingly, they use the country’s distance
from the technological frontier to measure the potential for imitation in their study
where the frontier is defined as the country with the highest level of total factor
productivity (TFP). Based on their assumption the further a country is behind the
frontier the more impact the R&D may have on increasing TFP through the transfer
from more advanced countries, see Table (2.2).
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(1) (2) (1)+ (2) Period No.
Study Own R&D Used R&D observations
Terleckyj, 1980 0.25 0.82 1.07 1948-66 20
(0.08) (0.21)
Sveikauskas, 1981 0.17 - - 1959-69 144
(0.06)
Scherer, 1982 0.29 0.74 1.03 1973-78 87
(0.14) (0.39)
Griliches 0.34 - - 1969-73 27
and (0.08)
Lichtenberg (1984a)
Griliches 0.30 0.41 0.71 1969-78 193
and (0.09) (0.20)
Lichtenberg(1984b)
Griliches, 1994 0.30 - - 1978-89 143
(0.07)
Table 2.1: Estimates of the social rate of return to R&D in
manufacturing-industry level
Source: Jones and Williams (1998)
Column 1 in Table (2.1) presents the social rate of returns to the industry from
R&D conducted by firms within the same industry which range from 17% to 34%.
Column 2 shows the social rate of return to R&D which is conducted in one industry
but is used in another industry. These estimates of the rates are relatively high.
Jones and Williams show the total rate of return to R&D in column 3 which is the
product of (1) and (2) added together. The value for the total rate of return is as
high as 100% for Terleckyj (1980) and Scherer (1982). Note that the estimates are
based on the data from the manufacturing sector.
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(1) (2)
Mean relative TFP National return to R&D
Frontier=1.000 including innovation & imitation
Canada 0.826 57.2%
Denmark 0.728 67.9%
Finland 0.525 95.2%
France 0.849 54.9%
Germany 0.901 49.9%
Japan 0.703 70.8%
Netherlands 0.905 49.6%
Norway 0.663 75.6%
Sweden 0.726 68.0%
UK 0.626 80.5%
US 0.994 41.7%
Table 2.2: Estimates of the Social Rate of Return to R&D in
Manufacturing National level for 1974-90
Source: Gri th (2000)
Gri th et al. (2000) assumed a constant rate of return to innovation of about
41.2%. As it is presented in table (2.2), the social rate of return to R&D in U.S.
is due to almost entirely to innovation where the average relative TFP in Finland
is just over 50% of the frontier’s, and less than half of R&D’s social rate of return
(95.2%) is due to innovation and imitation where it shows the imitation potential is
more important than innovation itself. They conclude that in non-frontier countries,
there is potential to increase TFP via the channel of technology transfers. This is
one of the critical studies which targeted OECD countries and estimated their social
rate of return to R&D at national levels.
Although there are studies which question the evidence of the large social rate
of return to R&D (i.e. Comin (2005) argues that econometric R&D spillover studies
potentially su↵er from omitted variable bias) due to some econometrics di culties,
the majority of empirical studies confirm the large and significant e↵ect of R&D
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spillover. Hence, an overview of the literature shows that the estimated private rate
of return to R&D is high and its social rate of return is even higher. If one accepts
the fact that there is a large significant return to research and development and that
the market is incapable of allocating the optimal amount of resources to R&D factor
in order to enhance the level of the economy, then she may consider the impact
of policy decisions and evaluate the e↵ect of these decisions on increasing R&D,
therefore growth in TFP. Subsidising research and development can be an example
of these policy decisions. According to Lisbon Strategy (2010) leveraging R&D is
the key element in the aim of European Union to become “the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” and to achieve this goal, countries
are required to increase R&D investment to 3% of their GDP. Due to uncertainty and
complexity of the models and cause and e↵ects relations involved in these analyses,
the consequences of these policies are still ambiguous. R&D is expensive hence it
should be well evaluated beforehand. More questions may arise, for example, how
much governments’ involvement is required? What instruments policy makers must
choose to get to the optimal value of the social investment on R&D to get the high
return? And questions regarding of testing the e↵ects of the related policies.
2.3.2 E↵ectiveness of the Public Spending on R&D
The existence of positive externalities for R&D investment and the fact that the
governments may need to invest in reallocating sources to more specific growth-
enhancing elements such as R&D make it necessary to study the e↵ects of publicly
funded R&D on growth. Despite the fact that majority of the studies in empirical
literature confirm a positive rate of return to publicly funded R&D, they conclude
that estimated returns are smaller compared to the privately funded R&D (Mansfield,
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1980; Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1984; Griliches, 1986; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991;
Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; and Di Cagno et al. 2014). Griliches (1992) paper even
suggests that the rate of return to privately funded and publicly funded R&D is not
significantly di↵erent at the company level. Bassanini et al. (2000) and Rodriguez-
Pose et al. (2004) show inconclusive results on the capacity of publicly funded R&D
to promote innovative activities hence the economic growth.
A comprehensive OECD survey on the sources of economic growth in 2003, shows
that in the developed countries during the 80s and the 90s only privately funded re-
search contributed to economic growth and publicly funded research based on this
survey not only has no significant impact on increasing TFP but also it is suspected
to have a negative e↵ect on the amount of privately funded research by displacing it
(companies using public funds to substitute the private funds for researching and pro-
duce the same level of R&D output as before). Hence the possibility of the publicly
funded R&D crowd out privately funded R&D is noted in many studies. Goolsbee
(1998) and David and Hall (2000) claim that any increases in the public fund to re-
search and development only enhance the wage of the personnel working in the R&D
sector and it does not increase the growth (at least in the short run). David et al.
(2000) mainly come up with the evidence of crowd-out e↵ect using U.S. data. There
are also some studies which suggest that public and private R&D are complements,
in a better word, some particular type of public R&D can have a distinctive positive
e↵ect on the funding to research and development provided by private sector. Co-
hen and Levinthal (1989), Geroski (1995), and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998)
provide empirical evidence in support of the impact of publicly funded R&D which
can increase the absorbance of the privately funded research while Gri th, Redding
and Van Reenen (2004) provide the theoretical foundations underlying the hypothe-
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sis of absorptive capability. Adams (1990) and Mansfield(1991, 1998) emphasise the
fact that public funds to universities and research institutes which focus mostly on
discovery of the basic knowledge have strong positive spillover e↵ects on commer-
cial R&D, although the knowledge spills over slowly from universities to commercial
sector (the delay of response makes detecting the e↵ect di cult).
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) in their dynamic panel of
16 OECD member countries conclude a positive e↵ect of publicly funded R&D on
private R&D, however they continue that for the public R&D to have the related
positive impact of TFP growth, governments are required to carry out a broad and
coherent innovation policy approach due to interactions between variety of elements
involved in the growth-enhancing process. This finding is supported by Afonso et al.
(2005). Herrera and Pang (2005) and Jaumotte and Pain (2005a, 2005b) note that a
well-functioning national innovation system which facilitates innovative activities and
the process of discovering new ideas and transferring it to the commercial sector is
required to increase the welfare of the nations. This system can be financed by policy
authorities and the optimal spot-on policy channels. Hence, due to the complications
and confusion about the e↵ect of the policy channel (i.e. direct subsidy to R&D) on
TFP growth, as Griliches (1995) stresses, the relationship between publicly funded
innovative activities and the economic growth remains a mystery. Publicly funded
research may or may not be e↵ective in increasing the private research hence inducing
an economic growth. Theories noted in section (2.2) with their complicated aspects
are still too simplified to take into account all the e↵ective elements of growth, for
example, R&D institutions such as universities (Nelson, 1998) can be a source of an
increase in R&D stock thus growth in TFP at the end.
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2.3.3 Applied DSGE models of R&D-driven Growth
Based on Hall et al. (2009), the impact of research and development of productivity
is usually studied econometrically. Although there is no consensus on the size of the
e↵ect, almost all microeconometric and macroeconometric empirical results present
positive, significant and even large rate of returns to research. Believing that the
social returns may be at least 3-4 times higher than the private returns to this im-
portant element of sustainable growth (Jones and Williams, 1998), makes the policy
intervention inevitable. While being very useful tools for the ex-post evaluation of
R&D e↵ects, econometric models cannot be employed for ex-ante impact assessment
of innovation policies (Di Comite and Kancs, 2015). Instead, macroeconomic models
need to be used for simulation of R&D and innovation policies and comparing the
results to the baseline (without policy) to see how policy should be structured if one
wants to ensure the positive or a large magnitude of the e↵ect.
Hence, evaluating policy strategies requires tools such as a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium structure which can be used to make a simulated world to help
to predict the impact of the policy shock to the economy. Most of the earlier DSGE
models lack the long-run growth structure. But there are more recent studies which
are focused on introducing the long-run growth to DSGE models. Wang and Wen
(2008) and Annicchiarico et al. (2010) growth-augmented a DSGE model through a
simple AK approach. Examples of R&D driven growth DSGE are Comin and Gertler
(2006), Comin et al. (2009a) and Holden (2011).
One of the latest versions of the class of DSGE models which considers R&D as
the driver to the growth is QUEST III developed by the European Commission. The
QUEST model is a simulation-based model to analyse the e↵ects of any structural
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reforms and the response of the economy to changes i.e. subsidy to research and
development to achieve higher growth. Hence this class of models are well-structured
tools for evaluating and testing the R&D-related policies. For example one version
of QUEST III used in the Department of Treasury which is an extension of the
DSGE model for quantitative policy analysis developed by the Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial A↵airs at the European Commission (see Ratto et al.
2008) and it is augmented to consider the R&D driven endogenous growth (Roeger,
2010). Roeger (2010) uses the framework introduced by Jones (1995b, 2005) to
adapt the Romer’s (1990) model including the research and development e↵ects on
growth (horizontal innovations). Di Comite and Kancs (2015) suggest that QUEST
R&D appears to be the most suitable simulation-based DSGE model for assessing
the impact of R&D and innovation policies over time (given the fact that R&D
investment decisions are inherently dynamic) as QUEST models are the only class
of models with inter-temporal optimisation of economic agents.
Notes on DSGE model of growth of Chapter 3: The empirical model of
growth discussed in Chapter 3 which is used in Chapter 5 to test and estimate the
e↵ect of research and development subsidy on growth is a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium augmented to include the endogenous growth element. The relationship
between growth and innovative activities derived through the representative agent’s
decision on spending time on these activities, hence the di↵erence between this type
of model with QUEST or the rest of theoretical and empirical studies that attempt
to find the impact of knowledge and innovation on growth is the fact that here
the time spent on innovation is directly ‘incentivised’ by spendings/subsidies (R&D
expenditures of any kind). In better words, an example of government’s subsidy to
research and development (which increases the R&D intensity) encourages the high-
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skilled representative agent to spend more time on growth enhancing knowledge-
producing activities. The time dedicated to innovative activities and not wage-
earning activities is the choice of the agent which is notionally conducted outside of
the firm but in the world of the model. The model I outline in next chapter is not a
firm-based R&D endogenous growth model (unlike the most R&D-based endogenous
models). This assumption is required to ensure the perfect competition in this model
(similar to Boldrin and Levine, 2002). The assumption of innovation being perfectly
competitive may come against the Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ approach
which relates the increase in innovative activities to monopoly rights. The model in
this study assumes no monopoly right given to firms by subsidy. The policy variable
is here just to encourage the household to spend more time on innovative activities
to increase the total productivity of the firm, and this is reflected in their share
of dividends in their budget constraint. Hence, this model does not emphasise the
non-rival, partially non-excludability condition, standing on the shoulder or business
stealing e↵ect which is discussed in this literature overview. It attempts to present
the di↵erence between returns to household coming from the higher firm productivity
encouraged by R&D variable in a frictionless market and the returns in the absence
of it, thus testing the e↵ect and probably estimate the magnitude of the policy e↵ect.
This is what I am interested in by isolating the policy determinants of growth.
These simplifications will save troubles regarding the complications coming from
the firm side; however, the logic is empirically valid and testable. Although the
model may not be the best microeconometric representation of the relation between
R&D and growth, it is a simulation-based model that can be used as a tool for policy
evaluation, and as it is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, the criticisms
to DSGE models are valid for this one too.
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2.4 Summary
In Chapter 2, I reviewed some theoretical and empirical literature on the endoge-
nous growth models. Most of the recent growth studies confirm the role of knowledge
and innovation in sustainable growth, and theoretical frameworks acknowledge the
positive impact of innovation on growth in nation’s wealth. The journey of the the-
oretical growth literature from the neoclassical approach to Jones’ semi-endogenous
and R&D-based Schumpeterian growth model is filled with di↵erent and even para-
doxical viewpoints on what really guarantee a long-run growth of production which
gives various policy recommendations. Hence it is required to have reliable empirical
results to check policies (i.e. research subsidies) overtaken. A brief review of the
empirical literature shows flaws and uncertainties in the results and measurement of
the impact of R&D on growth. Wieser (2005) and Mairesse et al., (2010) in their
metastudies survey the literature on the rate of return to R&D. Wieser reports micro
level studies measuring the private rate of return to research and development and
Mairesse et al. reports both macro and micro-level empirical results where microe-
conometrics attempts are doing better as related macro-level studies su↵er the lack
of identification. This thesis provides a simple but identified model of endogenous
growth which isolate the e↵ect of policy to evaluate the possible consequences of it.
A micro-founded model of growth outlined in Chapter 3 is a legitimate framework
for the empirical analysis of Chapter 5. Complications raised by augmenting a real
business cycle model to endogenize the growth factor of productivity in an open
economy make the simplification valid and defendable. Ultimately, this panel study
of the 11-OECD country wants to test and reevaluate the e↵ectiveness of the highly
accepted R&D factor on growth.
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Chapter 3
A Structural Small Open Economy
Model of Endogenous Growth
“Models are to be used, not believed.” -Henri Theil, 1971
Here I present an open economy RBC model following Meenagh et al. (2006).
The economy is open as it exchanges goods and services with the world and it can
borrow on global markets. Although it is an actor in the international trade, it is
‘small’ in the strictest sense; that is, it cannot influence the key macroeconomic vari-
ables such as prices or interest rates. The addition to this set up is an endogenous
growth mechanism which has been extensively used in the literature: innovative ac-
tivities. This endogenous growth process is similar to Lucas (1988), in that growth
in productivity depends on investment in time spending on productivity enhancing
activities; such as training to accumulate human capital with the di↵erence that in
the model I adapted the endogenous growth is characterised by investment in intel-
lectual capital as research and development; more similar to Grossman and Helpman
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(1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).1
In this chapter, an innovation-based endogenous growth model that can be tested
and estimated using unfiltered data2 is introduced. Section (3.2) undertakes the
workhorse model, and in section (3.3) a baseline calibration and the solution method
is presented, followed by a discussion of the model simulation and Impulse Response
Functions generated from a productivity shock. Finally, section (3.4) summarises.
3.1 The Model
The model of the economy is composed of an identical infinitely living representative
agents, which maximises the discounted sum of instantaneous utility. A single good
as output is produced in this economy that is used both for the consumption and
investment. The home economy coexists with ‘the rest of the world’ as the foreign
economy. Assuming the foreign economy to be large relative to the home country, its
income is una↵ected by the developments in the home economy. There is a perfectly
competitive final goods market.
At the beginning of each period, the representative consumer chooses to con-
sume, to hold savings for investment and to divide the time between the production
led activities and leisure. The representative consumer has the choice to withdraw
from its own normal work activities and invest time on innovative activities which
increase the productivity. This can be done through the channel of human capital
(Lucas, 1988), learning by doing or knowledge spillover (Romer, 1986), or inten-
1They developed the ‘Schumpeterian’ theory of endogenous growth- early models were produced by
Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990), and Corriveau (1991)- focusing on quality-improving innovations
that render old products obsolete, through ‘creative destruction’. The model presented here does not have
the monopolistic specifications emphasised in Schumpeterian-style of R&D-based growth models.
2Following Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (2012).
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tional knowledge creation and technological progress, i.e. R&D activities (Romer,
1990; Grossman and Helpman; 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; and Jones, 1995b).
The consumer choices are restrained by the budget constraint and the time avail-
ability as mentioned above. Although as an open economy, goods can be traded in
this model, for the simplicity it is assumed that these do not enter the production
process and are only exchanged as final goods. Setting up the model; initially, the
productivity is considered to be exogenous, later the model is extended to endogenize
the productivity considering R&D intensity as the driver.
3.1.1 Representative Consumer
The representative consumer chooses her consumption as a composite of home goods
Cdt and foreign goods C
f
t i.e. Ct = f{Cdt , Cft }. The consumption bundle is treated
as the numeraire, hence all the prices are expresses relative to the general price
level, Pt. Taking in to account that the economy is very ‘small’, prices in home
country is equal to the foreign prices. A classical Armington (1969) aggregator for
the composite consumption utility index in the assumed two country-single industry
model can be of the form as below
Ct = [⌫(C
d
t )
 % + (1  ⌫)⇣t(Ctf ) %]
 1
% (3.1)
where ⌫ is preference bias associated with the share of home goods in the aggregate
consumption. If ⌫ equals to 0.5, consumers are indi↵erent between home and foreign
goods thus 0.5 < ⌫ < 1 reflects the assumption that the representative consumer has
some fixed preference bias towards home goods. The demand for foreign goods is
subject to a stochastic shock, ⇣t.
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The representative consumer maximises her expected lifetime utility represented as
U =MaxE0
( 1X
t=0
 tu(Ct, `t)
)
(3.2)
where E0 is the mathematical expectations operator, 0 <   < 1 is the discount
factor, Ct and `t is the consumption and the amount of leisure time consumed in
period t respectively. The utility function u(.) follows a specific time-separable3
form as McCallum and Nelson (1999a).
u(Ct, `t) = ✓(1  ⇢1) 1 tC(1 ⇢1)t + (1  ✓)(1  ⇢2) 1⇠t`(1 ⇢2)t (3.3)
0 < ✓ < 1 is a preference weighting on consumption, ⇢1, ⇢2 > 0 are Arrow-Pratt
coe cients of relative risk aversion for consumption and leisure4 and  t and ⇠t are
the preference errors.
The representative agent splits her time between leisure activities and supplying
labour, Nt to the firm to earn the real wage, wt to consume and unpaid activities, zt
which known to have future returns. The total time endowment for her is normalised
to unity
Nt + `t + zt = 1 (3.4)
I left aside the choice of zt in (3.4) for now- it is discussed in 3.1.5 on endogenizing
3Time-separability of utility means that past work and consumption do not influence current and
future tastes according to Barro and King (1982). This form of utility functions does not restrict the size of
intertemporal substitution e↵ects, but it limits the relative responses of leisure and consumption to changes
in relative prices and in permanent income. These limits are important for evaluating the e↵ect of shifts in
expectations about future.
4The inverse of ⇢1(⇢2) can be interpreted as the intertemporal substitution elasticity between consump-
tion(leisure) in period t and period t+1.
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the productivity growth (also see Appendix I for some detailed information). Hence,
Nt + `t = 15. Here the representative agent choices are restricted to the leisure
activities and some non-leisure activities such as consumption and saving in the
form of domestic and foreign bonds. The budget constraint is
Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
+
bft+1
1 + rft
+ qtS
p
t = wtNt + bt + b
f
t + (qt + dt)S
p
t 1 (3.5)
where bt and b
f
t are home and foreign bonds respectively. The consumer’s income
includes the wage received from the firm for the hours of work, wtNt, bonds, and
the firm’s profit share in the form of dividends dt. Here the assumption is that in
every period, the representative consumer’s share holdings are equivalent to a single
share, Spt = S
p
t 1 = S¯ = 1 hence the value of the firm as total which is considered in
the budget constraint is equal to qtS
p
t   (qt+ dt)Spt 1 = dt. Consumer maximises the
expected discounted stream of utility (equation 3.6) subject to her budget constraint.
The Lagrangian is
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
 tEt
n
✓(1  ⇢1) 1 tC(1 ⇢1)t + (1  ✓)(1  ⇢2) 1⇠t`(1 ⇢2)t  
 t[Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
+
bft+1
1 + rft
  wtNt   bt   bft   dt]
o (3.6)
first order conditions respect to Ct, `t, bt+1 and b
f
t+1 are as below
@L
@Ct
=  t✓C
 ⇢1
t    t (3.7)
5Furthermore for convenience in the logarithmic transformations we assume that approximately L = N
on average as the consumer spends 50% of her time on leisure activity and the rest on providing labour for
the firm.
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@L
@`t
= ⇠t(1  ✓)` ⇢2t   wt t (3.8)
@L
@bt+1
=
  t
1 + rt
+  Et t+1 (3.9)
@L
@bft+1
=
  t
1 + rft
+  Et t+1 (3.10)
substituting (3.13) in (3.11) yields Euler Equation, describes intertemporal sub-
stitution in consumption as,
(1 + rt) =
1
 
Et
⇥  t
 t+1
⇤⇥ Ct
Ct+1
⇤ ⇢1 (3.11)
as the cost of one extra unit of utility at time t is 1(1+rt) in terms of the discounted
expected consumption utility at time t + 1. Combining equations (3.11) and (3.12)
gives
wt =
(1  ✓)⇠t` ⇢2t
✓ tC
 ⇢1
t
(3.12)
Intratemporal condition equates the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure to their price ratio. This will be wt as the price for consumption
is the numeraire. To derive the uncovered interest parity condition in real terms
(RUIP), equation (3.13) is substituted into (3.14)
(1 + rt)
(1 + rft )
= 1 (3.13)
The economy is small and open, hence rt = r
f
t . Contrary to the situation in the
closed economy, in this economy, the interest rate is independent of savings and
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investments. At the time of investment surplus, the agent borrows from the foreign
countries and lends to them when she has the saving surplus.
3.1.2 Representative Firm
The representative firm hires labour and buys capital to produce a homogenous
consumption good using a constant-returns-to-scale production technology with di-
minishing marginal products to labour and capital. Then it sells the good to repre-
sentative consumer or government. Choosing a Cobb-Douglas production function,
the firm’s technology is described as:
Yt = AtK
1 ↵
t N
↵
t (3.14)
where Yt is aggregate output per capita, At represents the state of the technology at
time t, Kt is the capital carried over from the last period (t  1), Nt is the labour
demanded by the firm and 0  ↵  1 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs.
It is assumed that production technology f(Nt, Kt) is strictly concave and satisfied
Inada conditions6. The law of motion for capital, Kt = It + (1   )Kt 1, shows how
capital per unit of e↵ective workers evolves during the time where It is the gross
investment and   is the depreciation rate.
6Based on Inada assumptions (1963), a per capita production function f : R+ ! R+ should satisfy
f(0) = 0 f 0(1) = 0
f 0(0) =1 f(1) =1
and it also needs to be strictly increasing; f 0(h) > 0 and strictly concave; f 00(h) < 0 for all h 2 R+. Inada
type of conditions is widely used in the applied economic literature. Usawa used these conditions in his
series of two-sector growth models realising that these conditions are su cient to ensure the existence of
equilibria. These conditions are intuitively very plausible and easily justified i.e. in the Cobb-Douglas
production function presented here as Inada conditions guarantee that the marginal product of capital (or
labour) approaches infinity as capital (or labour) goes to zero and approaches zero as capital (or labour)
goes to infinity.
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Hence, the firm’s profit function includes the cost of capital and labour and the
cost of capital covers the return to debt holders7, capital depreciation  , adjustment
costs at. Firm’s profit function is:
⇧t = Yt  Kt(rt +   + at + t) Nt(wt +  t) (3.15)
where t and  t are shocks that capture the e↵ect of excluded imposts or regulations
on the firm’s use of capital and labour respectively. For analytical and econometric
convenience, the adjustment costs are assumed to be strictly convex8 and quadratic9,
at =
'
2
( Kt)2
Kt
with ' as the adjustment cost parameter. Subject to these constraint,
the representative firm maximises its present discounted stream of cash flows, V, as
following:
V = E0
1X
t=0
dtkEt
n
Yt  Kt(rt +   + t)  '
2
( Kt)
2  Nt(wt +  t)
o
(3.16)
dk is the firm’s discount factor. The first order conditions are
@V
@Kt
= (1  ↵)( Yt
Kt
)  (rt +   + t)  '( Kt) + dk'(Et Kt+1) (3.17)
@V
@Nt
= ↵(
Yt
Kt
)  (wt +  t) (3.18)
7The firm undertakes capital investment by issuing debt at time t and pays the cost, rt at time t+ 1.
8Strictly convex adjustment costs imply that it is always optimal to make a continuous, non-zero
adjustment as the costs increase with the size of adjustments.
9As Sargent (1978, 1987) identified, quadratic objective functions have the advantage of generating
linear decision rules which allows the optimisation problem to remain tractable.
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a non-linear demand for capital is derived from equation (3.17)
Kt =
1
(1 + dk)
Kt 1 +
dk
(1 + dk)
EtKt+1 +
(1  ↵)
'(1 + dk)
(
Yt
Kt
)
  1
'(1 + dk)
(rt +  )  1
'(1 + dk)
t
(3.19)
and rearranging (3.18) gives the representative firm’s demand for labour
Nt =
↵Yt
wt +  t
(3.20)
3.1.3 The Government
It is assumed that the markets are perfect and there are no market failures. According
to this fact, the government does not directly a↵ect the agents’ decision making, and
the stabilisation policy is neutral; thus all the fluctuations and cycles are only the
optimal responses of the representative agents to the exogenous shocks. Hence, in
this framework, the government consumption, Gt, is assumed to be non-productive
and strictly for the welfare transfers. As it is a no-tax economy, the government
compensates its consumption only by borrowing (issuing bonds at time t, maturing
in the following period, t+ 1).
Gt + bt =
bt+1
1 + rt
(3.21)
Another assumption is that the government’s consumption of current output follows
a non-negative stochastic process such that Gt  Yt for all t.
65
3.1.4 The Foreign Sector
A further extension to RBC model following Kydland, Backus, Kehoe (1991) to
have the open economy elements in the model makes it possible to assume that the
country’s consumption and investment decisions are not restricted to its own pro-
duction anymore. The representative agent can smooth its consumption during the
time by considering import and export in its demand for consumption. By using
Armington (1996) assumption in section (3.1.1), it is presented that the homogenous
consumption goods produced in this framework ‘can’ be distinguished by their origin
of production, thus given the demand for foreign goods in equation (3.5), the import
and export equations are
IM = Cft = Ct[(1  ⌫)⇣t]  (3.22)
EX = (Cdt )
⇤ = (Ct)⇤[(1  ⌫F )⇣⇤t ] F (3.23)
where the demand for export is given in equation 3.27, where (Cdt )
⇤ is foreign de-
mand for home goods, (Ct)⇤ is the general consumption in the foreign country, ⌫F
and  F are the foreign equivalents to home bias and the elasticity of marginal substi-
tution between home and imported goods. Equation (3.27) describes that export is
positively related to the total consumption in foreign country. Foreign bonds evolve
during the time to satisfy the balance of payments constraint.
 bft+1 = r
f
t b
f
t + (EXt   IMt) (3.24)
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as equation (3.28) presents the current account surplus (sum of the trade balance
plus net income flows from foreign assets) is equal to capital account deficit (decrease
in the country’s net foreign assets).
3.1.5 Endogenizing Productivity Growth
In this section, I extend the model presented in section (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) to include
a new determination for productivity growth, zt. In endogenous growth models, one
key channel of growth is via labour being withdrawn from ‘normal activities’ and
being used for an activity that raises productivity. Here I think of it as ‘innovation’
similar to Klette and Kortum (2004). In Lucas’ model (1988), this productivity-
enhancing activity is education, in Aghion and Howitt (1998) following a Schum-
peterian method of ‘creative destruction’, the channel to increase total factor pro-
ductivity is firm-specific research and developments. Notice that the maximisation
problem is the same for all of these models; the agent diverts appropriate time of her
into productivity-enhancing activities. She decides the optimal time to devote to zt
by maximising its expected welfare. The productivity growth is
At+1
At
= ↵0 + ↵1zt + ut (3.25)
where zt is the time spent on innovative activities, ↵1 is the marginal impact of the
innovations on the total factor productivity growth with ↵1 > 0, and ut is the error
process. Here in this model by considering innovative activities as the channel to
derive growth, all the other factors that might systematically a↵ect the growth are
included in the error term.
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The consumer’s optimising decision is developed for zt as following :
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
 tEt
n
✓(1  ⇢1) 1 tC(1 ⇢1)t + (1  ✓)(1  ⇢2) 1⇠t`(1 ⇢2)t  
 t[Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
+
bft+1
1 + rft
+ ⇡tzt   wt(1  `t   zt)  bt   bft   dt]
o (3.26)
note that the dividend income, dt in (3.30) is the output reduced by the capital and
labour costs, i.e. profit. This is important since the agent is the sole shareholder of
the firm. Given the relationship in (3.29), any increase in zt will permanently raise
the productivity from time t+1. By this increase, the agent’s income expected to
increase through the dividends as the firm gets higher profit. F.O.C respect to zt is
@L
@zt
=   t t(wt + ⇡t) + Et
1X
i=1
 t+i t+i
@dt+i
@zt
(3.27)
to capture the e↵ect of productivity enhancing activity in @dt+i@zt first we need to find
@At+i
@zt
.
@At+i
@zt
= (
@At+i
@At+i 1
)(
@At+i 1
@At+i 2
)...(
@At+2
@At+1
)(
@At+1
@zt
) (3.28)
given equation (3.29), ( @At+i@At+i 1 ) = (
At+i
At+i 1 )
10 , for all i   1, there will be
@At+i
@zt
= ↵1At(
At+i
At+1
) (3.29)
10 At+1
At
= ↵0 + ↵1zt + ut gives  lnAt+1 + 1 = ↵0 + ↵1zt + ut.
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@dt+i
@zt
= (
Yt+i
At+i
)(
At+i
At+1
)↵1At (3.30)
substituting @dt+i@zt = (↵1Yt+i)(
At
At+1
) in equation (3.31), gives
 t t(wt + ⇡t) = {Et
1X
i=1
 t+i t+iYt+i}{ ↵1
↵0 + ↵1zt + ut
} (3.31)
rearranging equation (3.35) for zt and substituting for the multiplier  t and  t+i
derived in equation (3.11) will give
zt =
Et
P1
i=1  
t+i( t+i✓C
 ⇢1
t+i )Yt+i
 t( t✓C
 ⇢1
t )(wt + ⇡t)
  ↵0 + ut
↵1
(3.32)
as ↵1zt =
At+1
At
  (↵0 + ut), equation (3.36) will be
At+1
At
=
↵1Et
P1
i=1  
i t+iC
 ⇢1
t+i Yt+i
 tC
 ⇢1
t (wt + ⇡t)
(3.33)
I assume an AR(1) process for  t, such that  t = µ  t 1 + ✏ ,t, thus Et
P1
i  t+i =
 t
P1
i µ
i
t. If we assume ⇢1 to be approximately equal to unity
11 and approximating
Ct
Yt
as a random walk12, equation (3.37) will be as following
11Section (3.2.1) presents that ⇢1 = 1 gives the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for the
consumption, 1⇢1 equal to one which is consistent with the literature.
12Et(
Yt+i
Ct+i
) = YtCt (see Appendix I).
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At+1
At
= ↵1.
(  µ 1  µ  )(
Yt
Ct
)
(wtCt )(1 + ⇡
0
t)
(3.34)
where ⇡0t =
⇡t
wt
, determines the subsidy to innovative activities which is presented as
the opportunity cost of withdrawal from ‘standard’ wage-earning activities. Using
Taylor approximation on equation (3.38) 13 and linearising it will give
At+1
At
=  0 +  1⇡
0
t + errort (3.35)
as At+1At =  At+1 + 1, after collecting the constant the expression is
 At+1 =  
0
0 +  1⇡
0
t + u
0
t (3.36)
where  1 is the rate of return to innovative activities14. By taking zt choice, the
agent takes all other sources of productivity growth such as human capital accumu-
lation as exogenous therefore a↵ecting the constant  00 and the disturbance in the
productivity time series. To summarise the process of endogenizing the productivity,
I used the agent’s optimal choice for zt to derive productivity growth as a linear
function of ⇡0t; the subsidy rate on innovative activities. The choice of calibration for
 1 is discussed in section (3.2.1).
13Approximation around the point where
Yt
wt
=
Y
w
and ⇡0t = ⇡
0 gives
At+1
At
= ↵1.
(
 µ 
1   µ  )
(1 + ⇡0t)
(
Y
w
) + ↵1.
(
 µ 
1   µ  )
(1 + ⇡0t)
(
@Yt
@wt
) + ↵1.
(
 µ 
1   µ  )(
Y
C
)
(
w
C
)(1 + ⇡0t)
@⇡0t
14derived from the first order approximation;  1 = ↵1.
(
 µ 
1   µ  )(
Y
C
)
(
w
C
)(1 + ⇡0t)
.
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3.1.6 Completing the Model
To complete the model we need a balanced government budget and goods market
clearing condition to guarantee the market clearing conditions in the model discussed
above.
bt+1 = (Gt   ⇡tzt) + (1 + rt)bt (3.37)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +NXt (3.38)
Equation (3.41) is the government budget constraint which brings together the rev-
enues it raises from households and the transfer it; one channel of this transfer is
via subsidising the innovative activities, zt. Equation (3.42) is goods market clearing
condition in which households buy consumption and investment goods from firms
who supply them domestically or from the net output they purchase on the world
market at the exogenous world prices which are set to unity. Taking the representa-
tive agent’s budget constraint as following
Ct + bt+1 + b
f
t+1 + ⇡tzt = wtNt + (1 + rt)bt + (1 + r
f
t )b
f
t + dt (3.39)
where dt = ⇧t = Yt   [Kt   (1   )Kt 1]  wtNt is the profit of the firm which is
transferred to the agent in the form of dividends. Substituting (3.41) and (3.42) into
(3.43) gives the balance of payments where the capital account deficit (net lending
abroad) is equal to the net foreign interest plus the net revenue of the trading goods.
bft+1   bft = rft bft +NXt (3.40)
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It is necessary to have a transversality condition to ensure a balanced growth equi-
librium for this small open economy meaning that the trade surplus (deficit) cannot
run forever by lending (borrowing) from abroad. Transversality condition imposes a
restriction on the balance of payments in the sense that trade surplus should clear
the current level of debt at a terminal time T .
rfT b
f
T =  NXT (3.41)
since changes in net foreign asset;  bfT is equal to zero.
3.1.7 Behavioural Equations and Stochastic Processes
Before I discuss the calibration and solution method in section (3.2), log-linearised
equations for the RBC models argued above is presented as below,
lnCt = Et lnCt+1 + (
1
⇢1
){ ln ( 1
 
)  rt}+ ✏c,t (3.42)
ln Yt = lnAt + (1  ↵) lnKt + ↵ lnNt (3.43)
lnNt = ln↵ + ln Yt + lnwt + ✏N,t (3.44)
lnKt = ⌘1 lnKt 1 + ⌘2 lnKt+1 + ⌘3 ln Yt + ⌘4 rt + ✏k,t (3.45)
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lnNXt = (
Y¯
N¯X
) ln Yt + (
C¯
N¯X
)lnCt + (
G¯
N¯X
)lnGt + (
K¯
N¯X
)[lnKt   (1       k)lnKt 1]
(3.46)
 bt+1 = r
f
t b
f
t +NXt (3.47)
lnGt = ln↵g + ln Yt (3.48)
lnwt = ln (
1  ✓
✓
) + ⇢1 lnCt + ⇢2 lnNt + ✏w,t (3.49)
lnAt = lnAt 1 +  1 ⇡0t 1 + ✏A,t (3.50)
⇡0t = ⇢⇡0 ⇡
0
t 1 + ✏⇡0,t (3.51)
Equations (3.50) and (3.51) hold as identities; the former is the market clearing
constraint and the latter is foreign bonds evolution equation respectively. Some of the
equations are log-linearised and some such as capital equation and market clearing
constraint which are not straightforwardly linear in logs, are linearised around the
sample mean values in equation (3.23)15 and (3.50). This linearisation is solely for
the sake of simplicity because the written program16 for these structural equations
15The capital demand equation consists of intertemporal dynamics, thus is linearised around a point at
which Kt = K¯ and Kt 1 and Kt+1 are related to K¯ by a fixed balanced growth rate.
16This program is RATEXP which is developed by Matthews et al. (1979) and further extensions are
added by Minford (1984). This program uses a complex solution method inspired by Taylor (1983).
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can easily handle non-linear and complex models.
There are six autoregressive shocks in the model denoted by ✏i,t where i stands for
the dependent variable that the disturbance is allocated to. Five of these six shocks
are residuals from the structural equation and only one is an exogenous variable
which we consider as a shock to output productivity (R&D shock). Productivity
shock is the only non-stationary process in this model and the rest of them are
straightforwardly stationary or trend stationary.
✏i,t = ci + ⇢i,t✏i,t 1 + ↵iT + ⌘i,t (3.52)
Innovations are identically and independently distributed disturbances for the
error processes in equation (3.56); ⌘i,t. To extract these innovations, the structural
errors ✏i,t are derived using McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982) IV method for the
expectational variables of the model. Innovations are used to bootstrap the model.
The process in brief is as following
• ✏i,t is estimated to find ✏ˆi,t = ⇢i✏ˆi,t 1 + ⌘i,t where ✏ˆi,t = ✏i,t   cˆi   ↵ˆiT
• ⌘i,t are approximated using the fitted residuals
• estimated innovations; ⌘ˆi,t, are used for bootstrapping
Consumption, labour demand, capital, the real wage are endogenous variables
with stationary, I(0), shocks, policy variable (R&D expenditures) is a stochastic
exogenous variable that is treated as stationary AR(1) process. Only Solow residual,
At, is considered non-stationary and modelled as a unit root process,
 At =  1⇡t 1 + ✏A,t (3.53)
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✏A,t = ⇢A✏A,t 1 + ⌘A,t (3.54)
Non-stationarity of Solow residual implies that a temporary shock to research and
development expenditure, the only policy variable in this model, can induce a long
run increase in productivity. The aim of this empirical work is to examine the
marginal impact and the duration of the e↵ect of the policy variable on the growth
of productivity. Chapter 5 presents the behaviour of the productivity around the
transitional path when it is shocked out by R&D.
3.2 Calibration and Solution Algorithm
As a DSGE model, the small open economy RBC model I discussed above is con-
sidered a standard tool of quantitative macroeconomics; thus it is used to measure
the importance of di↵erent economic phenomena and perhaps to provide a policy
prescription. Following Kydland and Prescott’s immensely influential paper in 1982,
most of the related empirical literature faces three major issues: 1) determining the
values of the parameters that describe preferences and technology (structural pa-
rameters), 2) measuring the fit of the model, and more importantly 3) choosing the
existing theory which explains the data to the best. Kydland and Prescott propose
to ‘calibrate’ their model; to select parameter values by matching some moments
of the data and by taking them from di↵erent studies which have estimated these
parameters on a microeconometric basis. In section (3.2.1) the calibration method
is discussed and the structural parameters consistent with the logic of the model are
chosen.
Subsequent to the calibration of the structural parameters, a solution algorithm
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for the rational expectation model is to be selected. Following Minford et al. (1984,
1986) a solution (projection method) to the model is outlined in section (3.3.2).
3.2.1 Calibration
Similar to natural science, economics uses theory to understand and explain the ob-
served features of the world, and one interpretation of the word theory is considering
a set of idealised or hypothetical facts about those features (Cooley, 1997). Looking
at the literature on the economic theories, it is not di cult to realise that these prin-
ciples are evolved during past five decades; from being just verbal arguments, these
ideas progressed to use mathematical logic in order to provide more precision and
clarity and due to the limitations to mathematical arguments; economists turned to
computation as a way of theorising. With all the developments in economic theories
and technological advances in computing, it becomes feasible to answer some impor-
tant economic questions by studying the behaviour of calibrated models.
What is calibration? Using the process known as calibration has a long tra-
dition in economics. Shoven and Whaley(1984) and Auerbach and Kotliko↵ (1988)
present a process of adapting calibration method to CGE models of public finance
and international economics. As Cooley (1997) noted “Calibration is a strategy for
finding numerical values for the parameters of artificial economic worlds”, calibration
uses economic theory as the basis to make a restricted general framework and then
maps the created framework into the data. Koopmans (1950, 1953) and the Cowles
Commission17 followers emphasize on a point that measurement without theory is a
17Cowles Commission in the 1940s and early 1950s outgrow Haavelmo’s seminal monograph. The Cowles
Commission economists’ primary concern was the identification problem-how to map the economic theory
to data. They developed the theory of identification to a high degree of completeness.
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very limited enterprise18.
Calibration encompasses the idea of the identification- to use economic theory to
be able to extract more information from the data, furthermore, it shows that the
relationship between theory and measurement is not necessarily unidirectional, as
in the calibration approach someone can use measurements to give a content to a
theory and also the theory gives path of thoughts to concentrate on ‘what to measure’
and ‘how to measure’ matters. The noted relationship between measurements and
theory distinguishes the quantitative economics from the conventional econometrics
approach.
What is the di↵erence between calibration and estimation? Further
discussion on calibrated models by Kydland and Prescott (1996), Sims (1996), and
Hansen and Heckman (1996) reinforce a view that quantitative theory represented by
calibration approach and conventional statistical estimation and inference method
are competing methodologies. There are economists who believe that statistical
econometrics is less ‘casual’ 19 and it is more accurate than the calibrated models,
as it relies on well-known parametric forms. Their emphasis is on a point that con-
ventional statistical econometrics produces not only point estimates of parameters
but also it measures the uncertainty about these statistics. The conventional econo-
metric approach which dominated the economic research since the 1940s consider
the observed data as given and use them to estimate the structural parameters; thus
they value econometrics as a search for the ‘data generation process’. In other words,
18In the “measurement-without-theory” debate with Vining, Koopmans firmly maintained that theory
must be prior to data (Hendry and Morgan, 1995) and data could not be interpreted without theoretical
presuppositions.
19Hoover (1995) describes calibration as ‘A model is calibrated when its parameters are quantified from
casual empiricism or unrelated econometric studies or are chosen to guarantee that the model mimics
some particular feature of the historical data’. He also describes Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) choices of
structural parameters in their study as ‘casual’ and their robustness check as ‘profanatory’.
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this approach takes the data and searches for a model which has generated this data.
On the other hand, calibrationists view the appropriate data or measurements to
be determined partially by the features of the theory since some of the parameters
are chosen based on the traditional econometrics method while the rests are based
on micro-founded theories. Concluded from the discussion above, calibration and
estimation are complements, not substitutes and both are instruments to capture a
better picture of the economic world.
I chose to calibrate the structural parameters and use them to generate impulse
response functions analysed in section (3.3.2). The selected parameters capturing
the specification of the RBC model outlined in section (3.1) are consistent with both
the logic of the model and the actual data. The calibrated parameters are explained
as below.
To ensure that total utility is well defined, the discount factor is bounded in an
intertemporal choice problem. There is a substantial set of microeconometric studies
that estimate the time discount factor of utility,  , for individuals. They found a
range of values between 0.9 and 0.99. Lower discount factor means a greater pref-
erence of individuals for immediate rewards over delayed rewards and vice versa.
Following Meenagh et al. (2010), the quarterly discount factor is set as 0.97 which
is relatively lower than the standard value of 0.99 in the literature (Backus, Kehoe,
and Kydland, 1992). By looking at the table of di↵erent empirically estimated dis-
count factors presented by Frederick et al. (2002), it is clear that there is no strong
consensus on time preference discount factor but it can be concluded that the 0.97
is a value within the range.
Following Meenagh et al. (2010), the fixed consumption and leisure preferences, ✓
and (1 ✓), is calibrated at 0.5 presenting an equal weight. The relative risk aversion
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coe cients are chosen as 1.2 and 1.0 for ⇢1 and ⇢2 respectively. ⇢2 = 1.0 gives the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for the leisurely activities, 1⇢2 , equal to
one which is consistent with the literature. For example in Kydland and Prescott
(1982) and Jones et al. (2000) set up of equilibrium business cycle models, they argue
that an EIS between 0.8 and 1 gives the best fit to the data. Following Meenagh et
al. (2010), ⇢1 is chosen comparatively larger implying a less than one intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption. Lucas (1990) uses the consumption Euler
equation and US average consumption and interest rates and rules out an EIS less
than 0.5; hence the chosen value of 1.2 is defendable.
According to McDaniel and Balistreri (2002), Schuerenberg-Frosch (2012), Siddig
and Grethe (2012) and others, the choice of Armington elasticities in the import de-
mand function has a strong influence on the simulation results in GE models; hence
calibration values for these elasticities should be chosen in a sensible way. The deter-
mined value for   and the foreign equivalent for this elasticity  F , is unity and it is
consistent with the literature. According to Feenstra et al. (2014) any value “in the
neighbourhood of unity regardless of sector” would be defendable presenting the fact
that the countries competitiveness exists but it is not sensitive to the foreign alter-
natives. Following this choice, the Armington weight associated with the proportion
of domestic consumption to the total consumption assumed to be 0.5 and likewise,
the foreign equivalent of it set to 0.5 by symmetry. Since the foreign and domestic
goods considered to be identical in both markets, the only driver for the di↵erence
between the domestic good’s consumption and the foreign good’s consumption ratio
is the preference shock, ⇣t designated in the utility function.
The quarterly capital depreciation rate is set at 0.025 corresponding to about 10%
depreciation per annum consistent with the US estimates reported by Prescott(1986).
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Parameters Role Value
↵ labour share in input 0.7
  quarterly discount factor 0.97
⌫, ⌫f home( foreign) bias in consumption 0.5
  quarterly depreciation rate 0.025
✓ preference weight on Ct 0.50
⇢1 CRRA coe cient for Ct 1.20
⇢2 CRRA coe cient for Lt 1.00
⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3, ⌘4 Capital equation coe cients 0.5, 0.475, 0.025, 0.25
Table 3.1: Calibrated values for RBC model’s coe cients
Following Minford et al. (2010), the labour’s share of national income is set at 0.7
and the capital equation coe cients after the linear approximation, ⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3, ⌘4, are
set at values as following
lnKt = 0.5 lnKt 1 + 0.475 lnKt+1 + 0.025 ln Yt + 0.25 rt (3.55)
where ⌘3 = 1  ⌘1  ⌘2 is a crucial constraint set to guarantee a long-run consistency
since the capital equation must not contradict the terminal conditions imposed to
the solution, see section (3.2.2).20
Recollecting equation (3.50), the coe cients for the log-linearised market clearing
constraint are derived from the data averages for 11-OECD countries from the period
of 1981-2014. Initially, the average values are calculated for each country, as they are
developed European countries they share similar characteristics; hence the averages
are very close. To provide consistency, same values are chosen for all 11 countries.
It is assumed that the long-run quarterly growth of capital,  k, is equal to 0.005.
lnNXt = ln Yt + 0.76 lnCt + 0.29 lnGt + 6.15 [lnKt   lnKt 1] (3.56)
20Capital and output should converge in the long run, (K=Y).
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Study Sample Period Type of Estimation R&D rate of return
Griliches-Mairesse U.S. 1973-80 growth rates on 41%
(1990a) 525 mfg firms R&D
Japan 1973-80 Intensity 56%
406 mfg firms
Bartelsman et al. Netherlands 1985,89,93 4 yrs growth rate 30%
(1996) ⇠200 mfg firms VA,4 yrs growth rate 173%
Harho↵(1998) Germany 1979-89 long di↵ growth rate 74% (net)
443 mfg firms
Rogers UK 1989-2000 VA Prod function 40% to 58% (mfg)
(2009) 719 firms with R&D flow 53% to 108% (non-mfg)
on input
Table 3.2: Estimated rate of return to R&D - Firm Data
There is not much of a consensus about calibrating the rate of return to innovation
since the macroeconometric literature does not o↵er a strong prior for the relationship
between total productivity growth,  At+1 and subsidies to innovative activities,
⇡0t. In dominant literature for research and innovation marginal impact on TFP,
R&D intensity (total R&D expenditure’s ratio to GDP) is considered to be a good
proxy for the time spent on innovative activities. Thus, I chose it to represent the
innovation in my model. Now the question is: ‘how much is the marginal impact
of this proxy on TFP?’ Literature presents di↵erent even sometimes contradicting
results regarding the private and social (considering spill-over e↵ects) rate of return
to R&D. Among those studies concentrated on the rate of return, some important
works are summarised in Tables (3.2),(3.3) and (3.4) which are extracted fromWieser
(2005) and Hall et al. (2009).
As it is explained in section (2.3.1) the social rate of return is obtained by adding
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Study Sample Period Own R&D External R&D
Griliches-Lichtenberg US 1959-78 11% to 13% 50% to 90%
(1984a) 193 mfg industries
Odagiri (1985) Japan 1960-77 157% to 315% -606% to 734%
15 mfg industries
Sterlacchini (1989) UK 1945-83 12% to 20% 19% to 35%
15 mfg industries
Goto-Suzuki Japan 1978-83 26% 80%
(1989) 50 mfg industries
Mohnen-Lepine Canada 1975, 77 56% 30%
(1991) 12 mfg industries 79, 81-83
Gri th-Redding OECD
van Reenen 12 industries 1974-90 47% to 67% 57% to 105%
(2004) 12 countries
Table 3.3: Estimated rate of return to R&D - Industry Data
the private rate of return which is defined as the benefit to the firm, industry or
particular country that performs the R&D to the sum of the returns outside R&D
for all recipients of spillovers from that firm, industry or country21. The magnitude
of the social rate of return depends upon the number of spillover receivers. For
example the social rate of return of Sweden’s R&D will be greater if all countries of
the world are included as potential recipients of the Swedish R&D spillover than if
only the G-7 countries22are involved (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and
Ho↵maister 1997). According to Jones and Williams (1998), the magnitude of the
e↵ect of R&D consists of the spillover e↵ects and based on it the social rate of return
21external R&D in Table (3.2) and (3.3)
22G-7=France, Germany, UK, Italy, Japan, Canada, US
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to R&D is much more than just a return estimated using the input and output of
the firms. They argue that the actual rate of return is 3 to 4 times greater than the
initial private rate of return to R&D.
Study Sample Period Own R&D External R&D
Mohnen OECD 1964-85 6% to 9% 4% to 18%
(1992ba) 5 countries
Coe-Helpman 22 countries 1971-90 123% (G-7) 32% (G-7 to RoW)
(1995) 85% (other)
Kao et al 22 countries 1971-90 120% (G-7) 29% (G-7 to RoW)
(1999) 79%(other)
van Pottelsberghe 13 countries 1971-90 68% (G-7) -
-Lichtenberg(2001) 15% (other)
Table 3.4: Estimated rate of return to R&D - Country Data
Considering Table (2.1), (3.2) and (3.3) and using Jones and Williams (1998,
2000) the intertemporal spillover e↵ects will be added to the selected private rate of
return; hence the actual rate is going to be approximately four times of the value
for the private rate of return. It should be noted that the starting value for  1
should not be chosen too low as it becomes di cult to distinguish the model from
an exogenous growth model. The selected value of 0.29 is consistent with both the
empirical literature of rate of return to R&D (Wieser, 2005; Hall et al., 2009) and
endogenously driven growth theories. This initial value will be adjusted by estimation
as the other coe cients are altered correspondingly so initial value for  1 would not
a↵ect the model
The initial calibration values are used to derive Impulse Response Functions in section
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(3.3.2). The R&D shock chosen to be large (%100 increase in subsidy at time t = 0)
in order to have reasonably clear images for the after-shock behaviours of the system.
3.2.2 Solution Algorithm
The model introduced in Chapter (3) is a rational expectational model with forward-
looking variables such as consumption and foreign debt. The general problem with
this strand of models in which there are current or lagged expectations of future
variables is that there is infinity of solution path (Shiller, 1978) and as it is noted in
Minford et al. (1979), some of these paths are also divergent. This problem can be
solved typically by imposing the additional condition on the model to make the solu-
tion convergent (Sargent and Wallace, 1973; Minford, 1978). The condition sets the
coe cient on divergent roots within the general solution to zero to ‘rule out specu-
lative bubbles’ (Sargent and Wallace, 1973). Minford and Matthews (1978) proposal
is that imposing a terminal equilibrium condition will ensure unique solutions for
this kind of models whether linear or non-linear. It is useful to mention that these
solutions are identical with the solutions obtained when the convergence condition
is imposed to those linear rational expectation forward-looking models.
Thus, to solve the model discussed in this chapter, a terminal date, T , which
needs to be relatively large to deal with the sensitivity of the algorithm, is chosen to
ensure a solution for the model. In brief, the idea of the terminal condition is that
beyond T , all the expectational variables are set to their long-run equilibrium value.
There are several iterative methods to solve a rational expectation model. In
this study, a first-order solution which is built in a computer program called RA-
TEXP, developed by Matthews (1979) and extended further by Minford et al., in
1984 using Fair and Taylor (1983); is chosen. The algorithm uses a backward-solving
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method similar to dynamic programming with a di↵erence that the solution vector
is approached simultaneously for all t=1,2,..,T but the convergences happen follow-
ing a backwards process. Thus the process begins with the initial ‘guesses’23 for
the forward-looking variables, then the equality between the expectations and the
forecasted values from the model is checked, the initial values for these variables are
gradually changing till the convergence is obtained.
To discuss further, a first order solution method for a non-linear dynamic model
with consistent expectations similar to Fair and Taylor (1983) is assumed.
f(Yt, t, Yt 1, xt, ut; ✓) = 0 (3.57)
with
 t = {Yt+1, Yt+2, ..., Yt+k} (3.58)
rewriting the system of the equation in a normalised form will give
Yt = g{Yt, t, Yt 1, xt, ut; ✓} (3.59)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables,  t is a vector of expected future en-
dogenous variables, Yt 1 is a vector of predetermined endogenous variables, xt is a
vector of endogenous variables, ut is a vector of exogenous shock processes and ✓ is
a vector of calibrated parameters. First an initial guess for the expectation variable
i.e., Y  t+1, t = {1, ..., T} is made24. Then the system of equation is solved for the
23i.e., Jacobi Method.
24The model includes the lagged variable for Yt 1 which is predetermined in each period of the time
so it is considered to be fixed. Note that only in the first period the value for Y   is outside of the model
solution period which is known as the initial conditions and usually set as the actual historical data hence
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iteration of  ,   = {1, ..., V }.
Y  t = g(Y
 
t , 
  1
t , Yt 1, xt, ut; ✓)
t = 1, ..., T
By treating    1t as fixed, the system of equations can be solved using first order
solution method such as Gauss-Seidel or Newton’s method 25. The next step is to
update the value for the expectational variables in the model and repeat the iterations
till the convergence happens. By convergence we mean
max
t
|   t      1t |< " (3.60)
where " is a pre-assigned tolerance level. It is often computationally e cient to
choose the loose tolerance to pace up the convergence procedure. These iterations
are called Type II iterations by Fair and Taylor (1983).
It must be noted that for simplicity the REFV26 model of this chapter is log-
linearised as it is more convenient to have all variables in the log or fractional
form (i.e. interest rate). The reason to use RATEXP is solely because of the non-
stationarity characteristic of some of the variables such as net foreign assets. It is
most crucial to impose a terminal condition on foreign debt to guarantee the unique
solution for the model. Although it is not necessary to log-linearise the REFV model
treated as exogenous in the model
25In RATEXP, Gauss-Seidel method of iterations is used because of its simplicity and less computational
time per each iteration. However, the slow rate of convergence may result in a much larger number of
iterations. Using Newton’s method needs less number of iterations to reach convergence than Gauss-Seidel,
but it needed more complex programming techniques
26Rational Expectation Forward-looking Variables
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of the study, to achieve straightforward intuition we have the behavioural equations
in (3.1.7) linearised. As this does not lead to rejection, hence there won’t be any
inadequate approximation problem.
3.3 Model Simulations and the Impulse Response Functions
Once the model is calibrated, and initial values are assigned to the parameters of
the preference the model can be solved numerically and the characteristics of the
model in transition to the steady state be studied. The reasons for this attempt
is: 1) economy is not at the steady state in the first place or 2) there are policy
interventions altering the steady state. As the second reason seems to be of greater
concern, there is always demands to evaluate the impact of the policy rules; hence it
is crucial to simulate the dynamic model to study the characteristics of these pivotal
systematic movements and even shed lights on the causation of these movements.
3.3.1 Simulations
By looking at the literature, one can conclude that experimentalism finally reached
economic methodology (Reiss, 2008, chap. 5). In spite of that every day there are
more studies focusing on performing economic experiments, it is still valid to believe
that one cannot subject the whole economy to experimental control mostly because
some economic phenomena are inaccessible due to ethical, technical or practical rea-
sons. Most importantly we have to accept the fact that observational studies in
economics su↵er from ‘problem of co-founders’ (Steel, 2004) meaning that in occa-
sions researchers are incapable of distinguishing the causal e↵ects of phenomena by
empirical means. These di culties do not make the experimental economic studies
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inscrutable to the rational evidence-based investigation, thanks to computer simula-
tions which increase the ability of economists to produce more developed empirical
analyses of the facts.
There are three primary dominant definitions of (computer) simulation in method-
ological and philosophical literature.
• using computer to solve equations that are not or cannot be solved analytically
(Pritzker, 1979; Troitzsch, 1997; Frigg & Reiss, 2009).
• using computer to mimic a process by another (computer) process (Zeigler,
1976; Pritzker, 1984; Humphreys, 2004).
• using computer simulations to explore the properties of the model aimed at
drawing inferences (Reiss,2006)
The advantage of using the simulation-based methodology is that although it re-
quires the analytical relations in the background, it reduces the complexity. In a
better word, the high computational power of simulations decreases the degree of
‘idealisations’ in the underlying model27. Some may argue that the simulation does
not generate optimal solutions to the model, but it has the advantage of being flexi-
ble; hence changes in the system variables can be made, and the best solution among
various alternatives can be selected.
The complexity of the dynamic stochastic model discussed in this chapter makes
it inevitable to use simulation method. In brief, here assumed a system of simul-
taneous equations representing the body and a chosen exogenous variable which its
27Paul Humphreys (2004) writes “Because of their increased computational power, simulations usually
allow a reduction in the degree of idealisation needed in the underlying model, idealisations that often must
be made in analytical modelling to achieve tractability. Because they are free from many of the practical
limitations of real experiments, simulations and numerical experiments allow more flexibility and scope for
changing boundary and initial conditions than do empirical experiments.”
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co-movements with the state variables are going to be studied. To achieve this goal
the model is presented in a possible simple format for the sake of tractability. To
evaluate the policy variable, the standard simulation methods compare the solution
of the model where the exogenous variable is perturbed with the base28 where no
alterations occurred. Specifying an exogenous variable to be the policy instrument
of the model, the idea of evaluating the policy e↵ect will be the comparison between
the perturbed solutions and the base. Simulated results are obtained as following.
Firstly, the model is numerically solved using the calibration and solution method
outlined in the previous section, secondly, the residuals remains after solving the
model construct the structural errors to be used to generate sets of innovations (as-
suming ARIMA(1,0,0) process for the errors to capture the e↵ect of the dynamic),
thirdly, the information in these innovations define the shocks in order to simulate
the model (using the bootstrapping method to withdraw these shocks in the process
randomly) and finally, the di↵erence between the simulation and base is generated,
and the impact of the policy changes will be tested or estimated.
There is also the matter of length of simulations. Following Lewis et al. (1999) a
large simulation period has been chosen. One of the main reason is that in solving a
non-linear rational expectation model similar to one we have here, it is necessary to
select a su ciently far terminal date for the simulation in order to ensure that the
simulation results are not a↵ected by this choice.
In Chapter 5, the simulation results are presented then the e↵ect of specified
policy variable is analysed and the direction of causation has been studied.
28In this study the solution to the system of equation using Fair and Taylor (1983) Type II fix in the
absence of any shocks is called Base.
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3.3.2 The IRFs
The impulse response to the policy variable, zt, at time t+ i to an impulse in period
t is defined as
IR(zt+i) = Etzt+i   Et 1zt+i (3.61)
The impulse response functions trace the expected behaviour of the system at
time t given the available information at that period and compare it to what was
expected at time t   1. Here I consider a di↵erence between the base-run of the
model -the solution to the model (go to 3.2.2) in the absence of any shocks which
replicate the data- and the simulation run after a one-o↵ shock to the policy variable
in the first period of simulation as IRFs for the model.
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Figure 3.1: Growth Episodes for a positive R&D shock (40 quarters)
To provide some intuition for the results, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the behaviour
of the model after a controlled shock is imposed to it. Since the focus of this thesis
is testing the dynamic e↵ect of the specified subsidy, I restrict the IRF analysis
to responses of the variables to one-time increase in the policy instrument, R&D
intensity which is measured as the ratio of GERD (total intramural expenditure
on research and development performed on the national territory) to total GDP.
The shock based on the assumption is very consistent with the AR(1) coe cient of
0.97; hence it is expected that the imposed one-o↵ shock has a long-run positive
e↵ect on productivity which lasts over 40 quarters (Figure 3.1). It is illustrated
that the output and labour supply are still growing after 40 quarters, while real
91
wages are smoothening out although converging to higher levels. In early quarters
labour supply tends to decrease (smaller than the base-run) after the one-o↵ shock to
productivity. It can be interpreted as the lower opportunity cost of z makes labour a
relatively less attractive way to earn, hence output falls in initial periods in response
to this ‘o↵-the-wage-earning’ activity decision of agent but as productivity increases
more, the output rises steeply from period 10. The real consumer wage rises to o↵set
the income e↵ect on labour supply from the productivity increase, but it is not a
dominant e↵ect. Eventually, Y and w will converge to higher levels implying the
permanent e↵ect of the positive exogenous growth.
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Figure 3.2: Business Cycles for a positive R&D shock (40 quarters)
Figure (3.2) depicts the response of capital to the shock where adjustment costs
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prevent the ‘investment overshooting’ and results in a higher level of capital. Govern-
ment spending has the similar attitude toward the shock as the output, first decreases
at some levels then converges to a higher level permanently. Net foreign assets ac-
cumulate throughout the simulations and the transversality condition ensures that
net foreign assets stabilise by the end of the simulation. Consumption increases due
to increases in output and real consumer wages and finally stabilises at the end of
the simulation period. The convergence will happen for all the variables however it
takes longer for some to stabilise after the shock.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, a testable micro-founded macroeconomic model for a small open
economy is constructed. It is proposed to be calibrated using priors extracted from
literature to ensure the theoretical consistency. A standard rational expectation
model adequately simplified by excluding money, taxes and unemployment benefits
is prepared to be used for a panel study consisting of 11 countries in Chapter 5.
IRF’s are provided to sketch the model’s reactions to a one-time shock of the policy
variable. This step confirms that the model is ready to be tested and the reasons
beneath the growth movements in stated elements can be studied in more details.
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Chapter 4
Methodology: Testing and
Estimation via Indirect Inference
One of the major unresolved issue in macroeconomics over past three decades is how
best to test an already or partially estimated macroeconomic models, particularly
DSGE models. In this chapter, I present the Indirect Inference Wald testing method-
ology which has been applied to an endogenous growth DSGE model presented in
Chapter 3. This chapter is set out as following. In section (4.1) we consider how in
recent studies the DSGE models have been evaluated empirically. In section (4.2) a
brief comparison between indirect and direct inference testing method is presented.
And section (4.3) summarises the chapter.
4.1 The Empirical Evaluation of DSGE Model
The previous formulation of macroeconometric models failed to fulfil some crucial
specifications; hence DSGE models appeared as a response to these shortcomings.
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One of the most significant of these flaws was that the conventional Klein and Gold-
berger’s macroeconometric approach- which was dominant in the 1960s- lacked being
structural- despite being referred to as structural macroeconometric models, thus,
they were vulnerable to Lucas critique that they must not be used for policy evalua-
tion (Lucas, 1976), and that they are not general equilibrium models of the economy.
Despite all the theoretical advantages of DSGE models as being micro-founded, its
failure in providing empirical results which fit the economic facts caused sets of ques-
tions about its superiority toward the conventional macroeconometric models. Sims
(1980) provided a complete answer to Lucas (1976), arguing that micro-foundations
are not a necessary condition for policy evaluation. He believed that DSGE models
are not empirically corroborated and even that the conventional econometric models
are performing well for economic policy evaluation. There have been subsequent
developments in response to the empirical failure of DSGE models. Smets-Wouters
(2007) is an example of an empirical success which addressed most of the empir-
ical limitations and some specification issues, although this achievement has been
questioned.
One of the major criticisms of DSGE models is about why these models have been
calibrated rather than been estimated and tested. Estimating using Bayesian rather
than the classical macroeconometric method is an attempt to answer this question.
Rare attempts to test them via the traditional method of testing such as Likelihood
Ratio ended in rejecting ‘too many good models’1. Estimating models using Bayesian
1Sargent remarked of the early days of testing DSGE models: “...my recollection is that Bob Lucas and
Ed Prescott were initially very enthusiastic about rational expectations econometrics. After all, it simply
involved imposing on ourselves the same high standards we had criticised the Keynesian for failing to live
up to. But after about five years of doing likelihood ratio tests on rational expectations models, I recall
Bob Lucas and Ed Prescott both telling me that those tests were rejecting too many good models.”Tom
Sargent, interviewed by Evans and Honkapoja (2005).
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methods of estimation is an attempt to response to these questions, as estimating
via Bayesian method gives more freedom to data to influence the final estimation
and it is more flexible in choosing the prior beliefs about the structural parameters
compare to the calibration method, though, as Hensen and Heckman (1996) pointed
out, if the priors are uninformative or they cannot be justified properly, then there
are not many di↵erences between the Bayesian estimation and classical maximum
likelihood estimation as still “too many good models” are going to be rejected.
In response to the empirical failure of DSGE models, there is a more radical
approach as it believes that all models are misspecified-in another word “wrong”-
but the question is “how wrong do they have to be not to be useful”2. Wickens
(2014) mentions all models are deliberate simplifications, but nonetheless, they may
be useful. By accepting the fact that all models are misspecified what will be the
point in testing them in a Popperian manner under the null hypothesis that they are
true? Canova (1994), argues that one should ask “how true is your false model?”
and evaluate this using a closeness measure rather than concentrating on them being
false thus useless.
Following Minford (1984), I adapt a di↵erent approach considering the role of for-
mal statistical tests of DSGE models which reflect the e↵ect of Friedman’s3 widely
accepted economic methodology. As it has been briefly explained, no DSGE model,
or any model, is capable of being completely ‘true’ as the ‘true world’ is more com-
plicated to be fully explained in a model. Thus according to Friedman, a model
should be tested ‘as if it is true’ and be judged on its ability to explain the facts by
2Box, G. E. P., and Draper, N. R., (1987).
3Friedman in his famous essay ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics (1953)’ argued that economics
as a science should not be judged on its objectivity; instead it should be judged by its simplicity and
fruitfulness as an engine of prediction.
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measuring the distribution of the data it can generate. In this sense, I evaluate a
DSGE growth model described in Chapter 3 using a formal misspecification tests.
In this spirit, the probability of rejecting this model gives a measure of ‘closeness’ of
it to the facts and the reality.
The progressive method of Indirect Inference provides a classical statistical infer-
ential framework for evaluating a partially estimated or a calibrated model, such as
the one under my study, maintaining the spirit of the early methods of evaluation
for RBC models. This approach also compares the moments generated by the data
simulated from the model with the actual data (see; Kydland and Prescott, 1982;
Kydland and Prescott, 1991; Chari et al., 2002). The di↵erence between the classical
method of evaluation for RBC model and what I adapted following Le et al. (2011),
is that Indirect Inference considers the joint behaviour of the variables as well. Here
an auxiliary model is in charge of describing the joint behaviour of the variables both
simulated and actual. In the next section, I discuss the method of Indirect Inference,
the testing and estimation procedure and the choice of the auxiliary.
4.2 Model Evaluation by Indirect Inference
Recent developments in computer science and increases in the computational power
of the machines made it possible to use simulation-based methods of estimation for
highly complex dynamic models. The basic idea behind all of these methods is to
compare the closeness of some specific properties of model-generated data with those
features of empirical evidence. These methods are known by various names, including
Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989;
Du e and Singleton, 1993; Lee and Ingram, 1991; and Jalali et al., 2013 ), E cient
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Method of Moments (EMM) (Gallant and Tauchen, 1996; Durlauf and Blume, 2008)
and Indirect Inference (II) (Smith, 1993; Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993;
Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996; Gourieroux, Phillips, and Yu, 2010). These methods
are mostly useful for models with intractable likelihood function such as nonlinear
dynamic models and models with missing or incomplete data.
Indirect Inference as a simulation-based method of testing and estimation for
the DSGE models uses an auxiliary model to mimic the behaviour of the structural
model. In this approach, the auxiliary is a window to give the view to the actual and
simulated data. Indirect Estimation may be distinguished from Indirect Inference
testing. In Indirect Estimation, the parameters of the structural model are chosen
in a way that the simulated model generates similar estimates of the auxiliary model
to those obtained from the data. To use Indirect Inference to test the model, the pa-
rameters of the structural model are considered given (calibrated or estimated before
the test). I use indirect Inference test as the baseline for the Indirect Inference esti-
mation carried out in Chapter 5. For more information about the Indirect Inference
as a method of testing see, Le et al. (2011). They present Indirect Inference Wald
test that concentrates on some specific features of RBC models. In the next sections,
the indirect inference as the method of evaluation and estimation is discussed.
4.2.1 Definition for Indirect Inference
One of the hallmarks of the method of Indirect Inference is that it compares the
performance of the auxiliary model- general but simple formal model- estimated
from the actual data with the performance of the simulated data derived from the
model. As a window to view both actual and simulated data, auxiliary models do
not require to be very accurate descriptions of the data generating process. It can
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represent particular aspects of the model on which the study is focused. Le et al.
(2013, 2015) present a VAR as the auxiliary model, but they point out that IRFs or
moments could also be used as that window to look at the actual and model-generated
data and to check their closeness as a measurement of model’s performance. It is
not necessary to estimate the parameters of the structural model when we test it
via Indirect Inference. The parameters of the structural model might be already
calibrated or partially estimated using di↵erent methods of estimation such as the
Bayesian method. The null hypothesis is that “the model is true”. If the DSGE
model under the study is true, then the selected moment of the VAR estimates
based on these simulation results will not be significantly di↵erent from those derived
from the actual data. The main idea is to bootstrap the estimated DSGE model,
generating 1000 pseudo-samples which represent what the model and its “true errors”
could have generated for the historical sample data. The aim of the test is to compare
the coe cients of the estimated VAR using the actual data with the mean of the
distributions of the estimated coe cients for the simulated data.
Le et al. (2011, 2015) use the notation of Canova (2005), design a formal state-
ment of inferential problem as following. They define am⇥1 vector of observed data,
yt; t=1,...,T, a m⇥1 vector of simulated time series of S observations generated from
the structural model, xt(✓) where ✓ is a k⇥1 vector of the parameters of the macroe-
conomic model under our study. It is assumed that xt(✓) and yt are stationary and
ergodic. Then they define the auxiliary model as f [yt,↵t]4. The null hypothesis is
H0 : ✓ = ✓0 where ✓0 can be the calibrated or estimated value of the coe cients for
the structural model, based on this the auxiliary model will be f [x(✓0),↵(✓0)]. They
4An example of the auxiliary model is the V AR(p)yt =
Pp
i=1Aiyt i + ⌘t, where ↵ is a vector consists
of elements of the Ai and the covariance matrix of yt.
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consider ↵T as the estimator of ↵ using actual data and aT (✓0) as the estimator of ↵
for simulated data using ✓05. After bootstrapping and deriving N independent sets
of simulated data, it is required to find the mean of aT (✓0) as
1
N
PN
k=1 aT (✓0). The
Wald statistic is as presented in (4.1).
WS(✓0) = (aT   aT (✓0) )0W (✓0)(aT   aT (✓0) ) (4.1)
as aT (✓0) is the arithmetic mean of the estimated parameters of VAR and W (✓0) =
!(✓0) 1 is the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix. The variance-
covariance matrix, W (✓0) can be obtained from the asymptotic distribution of (aT  
aT (✓0) ).
Section (4.2.2) summarises the implementation of the Wald test and process to
estimate the model via Indirect Inference.
4.2.2 Indirect Inference Testing Process
Step 1: Calculate the structural errors using the actual data and ✓0
Solving the structural model and finding the related errors ✏t, is the first step. The
number of the independent structural errors is less than or equal to the number of
endogenous variables in the DSGE model, and the errors are not assumed to be
normally distributed. If there is no expectation in the model the errors could just be
withdrawn from the equations and the data but considering the expectations makes
it necessary to use the robust instrumental variables methods of McCallum (1976)
and Wickens (1982), with the lagged endogenous data as instruments. This gives
5The number of simulations S can be considered equal to the number of actual data T , since it is
required for the actual data to be regarded as potential replication from the population of the bootstrapped
simulation samples, thus it can be chosen as the same size as the actual data or a coe cient of it e.g
cT ; c > 1.
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the auxiliary model as e.g. V AR(p)6.
Step 2: Bootstrap, simulate data, and construct the empirical distribution condi-
tional on the null hypothesis
To simulate the data, the structural errors ✏t; {t = 1, ..., T}- some are stationary and
some are non-stationary- are modelled as autoregressive processes. The residuals of
the estimated AR processes are called “innovations” which are identically indepen-
dently distributed. The bootstrapping procedure then involves drawing randomly
with replacement from this set of i.i.d innovations to preserve any simultaneity be-
tween them, then the projection method due to Minford et al. (1983, 1986) is used
to solve the “true model” and generate the simulated data. To obtain N = 1000
bootstrapped simulations, this randomly drawing with replacement is repeated in-
dependently for each sample.
Step 3: Establish the Wald Statistic
To reject or not reject the null of the model being true, estimation of an auxiliary
model using the actual and simulated data is required. In this study- which is a
Panel analysis of an endogenous growth DSGE model- a PVAR(1) is chosen as the
auxiliary model- see 4.2.4 for details on choosing the auxiliary model. The aim is to
estimate the selected auxiliary model using both actual and N samples of simulated
data to obtain estimates of aT and aT (✓0) of the vector ↵. By estimating the auxiliary
on each of the bootstrapped simulations from Step 2, the distribution of aT   aT (✓0)
and its covariance matrix W (✓0) are found.
After computing the Wald statistic in 4.1, the inference can proceed by comparing
the percentile of the Wald distribution at which the critical Wald statistic falls within
6They used the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) procedure to estimate the expectations
on the right-hand side of the model.
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the chosen size of the test; for a 5% significance level, a percentile above 95% would
fall into the rejection area. As an alternative, Mahalanobis distance can be used
which is the square root of the Wald value. As it is the square root of a chi-squared
distribution, it is possible to convert it to a t-statistic by adjusting the mean and
the size and normalising it to ensure that the resulting t-statistic is 1.645 at the 95%
point of distribution. Thus the null hypothesis can be rejected if this t-value takes a
number greater than the t-statistic at 5% 7.
The VAR covariance parameter is important as assuming it to be equal to zero or
non-zero will change the value of the Wald statistics. In their experiment, Minford
et al. (2008) present non-zero VAR covariances generated by the bootstrap sample
variation make a Wald statistic of 100 (outright rejection) whereas zero covariances
will push the test to the non-rejection area (below 100 Wald statistics). Hence
considering a high covariance creates a ‘ridge’ out of the density function. Figure
(4.1) sheds more light on how this method is working. Assume a VAR with two
parameters which their variables are regressed on the own lagged value, and that the
model distribution is centred around 0.5 and 0.5, and the data-based VAR produced
values for their partial autocorrelations of 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. As we can see
when the correlation is 0, the model seems to explain a great deal of the reality (data)
where the filled square represents the estimated VAR parameters using the actual
data which is in a lesser distance to the mean of the estimated VAR parameters of
the simulation-generated data. By considering a correlation of 0.9, the mountain
7Following Wilson and Hilferty (1931) the normalised Mahalanobis distance is given as
t =
n p2MD  p2np
2MD95%  
p
2n
o
⇥ 1.64 (4.2)
where MD is the value of the Mahalanobis distance derived using the actual data in Wald and MD95% is
the value for it corresponding to 95% tail of simulated distribution and n is the degree of freedom of the
variant.
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Figure 4.1: Bivariate Normal Distributions (0.1, 0.9 shaded)
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rotates in such a way that the estimation of the VAR parameter of the actual data
falls far from the mean of the estimated VAR parameters for the model generated
data; hence the test rejects the model in explaining the properties of the data.
4.2.3 Indirect Inference Estimation Process
As mentioned earlier, Indirect Inference test is the basis for the Indirect Inference
estimation. The estimation process involves choosing the parameters of the macroe-
conomic model so that when the model under the null hypothesis is simulated, it
generates estimates of the auxiliary model which are similar to those from the actual
data. Here the question is how can we find ‘the best choice’ of parameters. The es-
timation procedure involves searching over parameter space, within certain bounds,
to find that vector of parameters. The Wald statistic measures the distance between
the data and the model thus to find ‘the best calibrations’, any minimising algorithm
to minimise the Wald can be used. Here the Wald minimising process refers to the
systematic process of minimising the distance between the coe cients of the VAR
of the data with the average of those of the model-generated data. The process, in
brief, is as following: 1) the function to minimise takes the coe cients as an input, 2)
it does steps 1-3 for testing the model and then 3) gives the Wald as the output. In
Chapter 5, due to Le et al. (2013), a ‘simulated annealing algorithm’ is chosen as the
minimising algorithm to perform the Indirect Inference Wald test for 1000 points in
parameter space. I searched for the possible best parameters within the 45% interval
of the initial calibration value. The parameters chosen to be estimated, are mostly
those preference-related parameters or parameters for which no strong priors exists
in the literature.
According to Le et al. (2015), for small samples, Indirect Inference estimates
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have a low small sample bias compared with the FIML systems estimator. Bayesian
estimators would bias the estimator towards the priors which when we do not have
information about the model parameters that will give a bias. Hence, using indirect
inference estimation method is valid and e cient.
There is this question about the power of the Indirect Inference evaluation method
after doing the estimation. As Le et at. (2015) present Indirect Inference is a very
robust test in rejecting the false models. The algorithm is as following, the new sets
of calibrated values for parameters will set up a new model which we consider as
the ‘true’ model. If the model is wrong, then the probability that Indirect Inference
rejects the model will be very high. Le et al. (2015) experiment of SW’s model
checked the validity of the power of Indirect Inference test. In evaluating the power
of the test, they use their Monte Carlo procedure and generate 10,000 samples from
‘True’ model and find the distribution of the Wald for these true samples. Then they
generate 10,000 sample from the ‘False’ model with parameters and find the Wald
distribution for it and finally they calculate how many of the actual samples from
the ‘true’ model would reject the ‘false’ model on this calculated distribution with
95% confidence level. This will give the rejection rate for a given percentage degree
of misspecification. Their experiment shows that with 5% misspecification, the Wald
statistic rejects 99% of the time while Likelihood Ratio test rejects only 15% of the
time. At a su ciently high degree of falseness both of them reject at 100% of the
time.
Le et al. (2015) ensure that the if the estimated parameters are far from estab-
lishing a ‘true’ model, the powerful Indirect Inference evaluation method will reject
it with a very high probability. For a high degree of falseness Indirect Inference
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and LR both are as good and as powerful in rejecting 100% of the time, and for
the lower degrees, it seems Indirect Inference will do better than LR. However, one
must consider that these two tests are measuring di↵erent things, as LR measures
the forecasting ability of the model while the Indirect Inference Wald test measures
the model’s ability to explain the sample data behaviour.
4.2.4 The Choice of the Auxiliary Model
After log-linearisation, almost all macroeconomic and financial econometric models -
even an endogenous growth DSGE such as the one in this study- can be represented
as VAR (or a VARMA) with restrictions (Wickens, 2014).
The data generated by a DSGE model are often non-stationary. The reasons for
the non-stationarity of the model generated data can be either because 1) the model
structure causes non-stationarity for example by making state variables functions of
variables that depend on accumulated shocks, such as net foreign assets, in this study,
or 2) because a non-stationary variables such as technology shock in the production
function is included in the model. Thus after log-linearising, the solution of the
model can be represented by Vector Error Correction model- an auxiliary model
with stationary errors. Following Meenagh et al. (2012)8 and Le et al. (2015a), I
show that the chosen auxiliary model is an approximation of the reduced form of
the DSGE model under the null of the cointegration9 and it can be represented as a
8They assume that the solution of the model can be represented by a VECM. Then they consider
that if there are unobservable non-stationary variables, such as a technology shock, the number of the
cointegrating vectors will be less than the number of the endogenous variables. This means that one or
more of the structural equations will have a non-stationary residual. To solve this matter they estimate
all of the coe cients of the model, construct the residuals, and they treat all these estimated residuals as
the observable variables. Now there will be as many cointegrating relations as the number of endogenous
variables.
9Constraint of the null guarantees that the VECM achieves cointegration under the null and the residual
assumption ensures that the DSGE model achieves cointegration.
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cointegrated VARX.
After log linearisation the DSGE model can be presented in the form of
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (4.3)
where yt is a p ⇥ 1 vector of endogenous variables, Etyt+1 is a r ⇥ 1 vector of
expected future endogenous variables, xt is a q⇥ 1 of non-stationary variables which
are assumed to be driven by
 xt = a(L) xt 1 + d+ b(L)zt 1 + c(L)✏t (4.4)
xt is a vector of unit root processes, elements of which may have a systematic
dependency on the lag of zt which is a stationary exogenous variable. Both et and ✏t
are i.i.d with zero means. As yt is linearly dependent on xt and xt is non-stationary,
as a result it will be non-stationary. The general solution of yt is
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)✏t (4.5)
where f is a vector of constants and polynomial functions in the lag operator have
roots outside of the unit circle. The solution to the model has p cointegrated rela-
tions10
10The matrix ⇧ is p⇥p and we found it when we solve for the terminal conditions on the model. Terminal
conditions restricts the expectations in the structural model and make them consistent with the model’s
long run equilibrium.
107
yt = [I  G(1)] 1[H(1)xt + f ]
= ⇧xt + g
(4.6)
in the short run yt is a function of deviation from the equilibrium; yt  [⇧xt+ g] = ⌘t
where ⌘t is the error correction term. In the long run solution to the model is
y¯t = ⇧x¯t + g (4.7)
x¯t = [1  a(1)] 1[dt+ c(1)⇠] (4.8)
⇠t =
t 1X
s=0
✏t s (4.9)
as we see the long run solution to xt can be decomposed to two components, the
deterministic trend; [1   a(1)] 1dt and a stochastic trend; [1   a(1)] 1c(1)⇠. The
endogenous variable consists of this trend and the deviations from it, therefore the
solution for yt can be written as this trend plus a VARMA in deviations from it. As
an alternative Meenagh et al. (2012) formulates this as a cointegrated VECM with
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a mixed moving average error term, !t.
 yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1   ⇧xt 1) + P (L) yt 1 +Q(L) xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)✏t
(4.10)
=  [I  G(1)](yt 1   ⇧xt 1) + P (L) yt 1 +Q(L) xt + f + !t
!t =M(L)et +N(L)✏t (4.11)
This can be approximated by the VARX with ⇣t as an i.i.d zero mean process.
 yt =  K(yt 1   ⇧xt 1) +R(L) yt 1 + S(L) xt + g + ⇣t (4.12)
since y¯t   ⇧x¯t 1   g = 0, the VECM can be written as
 yt =  K[(yt 1   y¯t 1) ⇧(xt 1   x¯t 1)] +R(L) yt 1 + S(L) xt + h+ ⇣t (4.13)
Either equations (4.12) or (4.13) can be used as the auxiliary model. Rewriting
(4.12) as below
yt = [I  K]yt 1 +K⇧xt 1 + n+  t+  t (4.14)
we will have a VARX(1) approximation to the reduced form of the model where the
errors  t now includes the lagged di↵erence regressors, and by considering the time
trend the deterministic trend in x¯t which influence both endogenous and exogenous
variables is captured.
I use PVARX as the auxiliary to assist the process of evaluation in Chapter 5.
Panel VARs have the same structure as VAR models in the sense that all variables
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are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent with the di↵erence that PVARs
are applied to panel data hence a cross sectional dimension is added to the VAR
representation. Following Canova (2013) notation, we consider Yt as the stacked
version of yit, the vector of G variables where {i = 1, ..., N} as i in this study indicates
the number of countries. Hence, Yt can be written as Yt = {y01t, y02t, ..., y0Nt}0. Then
the panel VAR is
yit = A0i(t) + Ai(`)Yt 1 + uit
i = {1, ..., N}
t = {1, ..., T}
(4.15)
here uit is a G⇥ 1 vector of random errors, A0i(t)11 and Ai(`) which is a polynomial
in the lag operator may depend on the unit. A panel VARX is assumed in this study.
The representation is
yit = A0i(t) + Ai(`)Yt 1 + Fi(`)Wt + uit (4.16)
where uit = [u1t, u2t, ..., uNt]0 is i.i.d with mean zero and variance of ⌃u, Fi,j are G⇥M
matrices for each lag j = {1, ..., q}, and Wt is a M ⇥ 1 vector of predetermined or
exogenous variables, common to all units i.
One of the disadvantages in using PVARs is that one needs to impose cross-section
homogeneity on the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables.
Most of the literature related to using PVAR models are implicitly assumed cross-
11All the deterministic components of data is compacted in A0i(t), thus it should be understood that
equation (4.14) may include seasonal dummies, constants or even deterministic polynomial in time (Canova
and Ciccarelli, 2013).
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section homogeneity for simplicity in the process of estimation.12
Hence, using panel VAR (pooling observations for a number of countries over a
given sample period), one needs to impose cross-country homogeneity on the relation-
ships among the variables. Some econometric adjustments are made to deal with this
objection. In particular, country-specific constant terms and country-specific linear
time trends are included in the regression to eliminate any cross-country contem-
poraneous residual correlation. These features reduce the amount of heterogeneity.
Also, the fact that 11 OECD countries studied in Chapter 5, share many similarities
is conducive to reducing heterogeneity.
4.3 Summary
This chapter introduced the concept of the Indirect Inference testing and estimation
methodology applied in the empirical work presented in this thesis. I provided a
definition for the Indirect Inference and a step by step procedure to the testing and
estimation method, following Le et al. (2013). Then, VAR, VECM, and PVAR as the
relevant auxiliary models are introduced. In Chapter 5, I first present the outcome
of the Indirect Inference test of the model given the initial calibration values for
the parameters, and then I proceed to estimate the model parameters and find the
optimal calibrations value using the simulated annealing search algorithm.
12Beetsma and Giuliadori (2011) and Lane and Benetrix (2011) look at the transmission of government
spending shocks and Boubtbane et al. (2010) examine how immigration shocks are transmitted in a variety
of countries. Love and Zicchino (2006) measure the e↵ect of shocks to financial factors on a cross-section
of U.S. firms, and they all assumed a cross-section homogeneity.
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Chapter 5
Testing and Estimating a
Multi-Country R&D-driven Model
of Growth
”An indispensable hypothesis, even though still far from being a guarantee of
success, is however the pursuit of a specific aim, whose lighted beacon, even by
initial failures, is not betrayed.” -Max Planck, Nobel Lecture (1920)
This chapter presents the process of testing a dynamic model of growth outlined
in Chapter 3 via the method of Indirect Inference. The aim is to verify the impact
of the knowledge-based policy variable (R&D intensity) on total factor productivity
growth. I firstly introduce the data- economic and Science & Technology indicators
in section 5.1, where they are illustrated and analysed through suitable analysis
method. Section (5.2) explains the details of the theory under the study, the testing
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procedure and finally, the results of the Wald test on the baseline calibrated model is
provided, then the parameters of interest are estimated using a ‘simulated-annealing
algorithm’ discussed in Chapter 4.
5.1 Description of Data and Methodology
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Figure 5.1: GDP growth (annual %)
Source: World Bank and OECD National Accounts data files.
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Figure (5.1) illustrates the annual GDP growth rate for 11-OECD countries under
the study for the period of 1980-2015. The data on gross domestic products of the
countries is extracted from OECD Main Economic Indicator (MEI)- OECD National
Accounts and the annual data on GDP growth from the World Bank database. As it
is depicted the OECD countries in the 1990s are characterised by widening disparities
in growth rates of GDP per capita (see Aiginger and Landesmann, 2002) with Finland
having the lowest growth rate of -6.42% in 1991 and the highest rate of 5.9% in 1997.
Japan experienced the lowest of -2.26 % in 1998 while it benefited from the highest
rate of 5.2% of the annual growth in 1990. It is evident from Figure(5.1) that all
11 economies collapse in 2009 with their lowest rate of growth (decrease in growth
of 4.22%) for OECD members with a recovery rate of approximately 2.3% in the
following year.
Country Minimum Value Maximum Value
Austria -4.05 3.55
Canada -4.36 4.91
Denmark -5.59 5.17
Finland -8.71 5.94
France -3.44 4.09
Germany -5.38 4.35
Japan -5.52 6.69
Netherlands -4.26 4.35
Norway -2.86 5.75
Sweden -5.99 5.09
United Kingdom -4.91 5.69
Table 5.1: Minimum and Maximum level of Annual percentage growth
rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency.
Hence, it can be concluded that there has been a tremendous economic and
technological catching up in past three decades. Despite the economic ups and
downs, the economic growth is still the primary concern of all nations and upgrading
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the technological state of the country to achieve this growth requires e↵ective policy
decisions which suitably decompose the elements of the growth and allocate resources
to e↵ective factors. As discussed in previous chapters technological change needs
relevant innovation-based policies; thus R&D is acknowledged as a principal mean
to enhance economic growth and competitiveness. How to evaluate and test this
e↵ectiveness is the focus of this study.
The data of the leading economic indicators are extracted from OECD National
Accounts data files, International Finance Statistics database (IFS), O ce of Na-
tional Statistics (ONS) for data on UK, Bank of England (BoE), Unesco Institute
for Statistics, Statistics Canada, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and
The World Bank’s DataBank (WB). The collected data consists of quarterly data
for the period of 1980Q1-2014Q4. In the cases where the quarterly data were not
available (i.e. data on average manufacturing earning index as a proxy for wages),
the quarterly data is derived from annual data using the extrapolation or interpo-
lation. All the data are seasonally adjusted and in constant prices unless specified
otherwise. Table (5.2) includes the definitions and descriptions of data used in this
study, as well as symbol keys.
Notes on Table (5.2):
1. Seasonally Adjusted using U.S. Census Bureau’s software package X12-ARIMA.
2. Hourly Average Earnings includes earnings series in manufacturing and for the
private economic sector. Mostly the sources of the data are business surveys
covering di↵erent economic sectors, but in some cases, administrative data are
also used. The target series for hourly earnings correspond to seasonally ad-
justed average total earnings paid per employed person per hour, including
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Symbol Variables Data Definition
Y Output Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices, SA1 USD, 2010 Prices
I Investment Fixed Investment, Constant Prices, SA, USD, 2010 Prices
w Consumer’s Real Wage The Hourly Earnings Index: Year 2010 = 1002 divided by GDP Deflator
N Labour Demand Seasonally Adjusted Employment divided by 16+ working population
K Capital Stock Capital Stock calculated using ‘perpetual inventory equation3’
A Total Factor Productivity Calculated as the Solow Residual
C Consumption Consumption, Private, Constant Prices, SA, USD, 2010 Prices
G Government Spending Government Consumption , Constant Prices, SA, USD, 2010 Prices
EX Export Exports, Goods and Services, Constant Prices, SA, USD, 2010 Prices
IM Import Imports, Goods and Services, Constant Prices, SA, USD, 2010 Prices
NX Net Export (Exports -Imports)
bf Net Foreign Assets Ratio of Nominal Net Foreign Assets (NFA) to Nominal GDP 4
Cf Foreign Consumption Demand World Exports, Goods and Services, Constant Prices, USD, 2010 Prices
r Real Domestic Interest Rate Nominal Interest Rate (Short Term) - next period’s inflation
rf Real Foreign Interest Rate Foreign Interest Rate (weighted average of EU(19%), US(60%),
JP(21%), then made real using Pf
P Domestic Price Consumer Price Index, SA, Index, 2010=100
Pf Foreign Price World, Consumer Price Index, Index, 2010=100
GDP Deflator Price Deflator, Gross Domestic Product, Index, 2010=100
⇡ R&D Intensity GERD5 as a % of GDP
Table 5.2: Data Description
overtime pay and regularly recurring cash supplements.
3. Unobservable variable, the capital stock is created following Caselli (2004):
Kt = It + (1   )Kt 1 (5.1)
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where initial level of capital K0 is given by K0 =
I0
(g +  )
.
4. Nominal NFA is accumulated current account surpluses, taking the Balance of
Payments international investment position as a starting point.
NFA(1981Q2) = NFA(1981Q1) + CAS(1981Q2) (5.2)
5. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) is total in-
tramural expenditure on research and development performed on the national
territory during a given period.
Source Publication: OECD Frascati Manual, Sixth Edition.
Direct subsidy to research and development is proxied by the ratio of gross expen-
diture on research and development to total GDP. The detail of the chosen policy
variable is discussed in the following section.
5.1.1 Policy Variable
Over the past decades, most of EU countries have the objectives encouraging the
increase in the level of investment to provide stimulus to the competitiveness. Lisbon
strategy was an attempt to set the EU a target of devoting at leat 3% of the member’s
GDP to research and development activities by 2010 which the target was not reached
thus the 3%-target remained one of the five key objectives of the Europe’s 2020
strategy adopted in 2010.
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Figure 5.2: R&D intensity of 11-OECD countries (1981-2014)
Source: OECD Stats (MSTI)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) for total OECD zone increased
from 161,688 million USD in 1981 to 1,181,495 million in 2014. Some countries
experienced faster growth in their GERD, and some grew slower during this period.
To make figures more comparable, GERD is often expressed relative to GDP which
is also known as R&D intensity. See Figure (5.2) which illustrates the gross domestic
expenditure ratio to GDP for countries of the study. The ratio declined modestly
during 1990-1994 from the average of 2.18% to 1.9%. This follows by an increase
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from 2000 to 2010.
Between 2004 and 2008 there was an increase in the relative importance of GERD
in the Japanese economy, as its ratio to GDP rose by 0.34 percentage points during
this period; note that Japanese economic growth was relatively subdued during this
period. However, in the period between 2009 and 2010, the ratio of GERD to GDP in
the Japanese economy fell by 0.22 percentage points, before bouncing back somewhat
(a gain of 0.13 percentage points) in 2011. Norway and Canada are two countries with
the lowest average R&D intensity of less than 1.7% for this period. UK spendings
on research and development declined enormously since 1981 (from 2.24% to 1.6%
in 2014). The information in Figure (5.2) may imply that di↵erent countries adopt
di↵erent policies regarding their spendings on R&D or as this rate is relative to the
GDP, any decline or improvements in the value of it makes significant changes in
the spending rate. It is possible that not much of increase happened in the research
sector and it is only due to declining in GDP from 2009, some improvements in
the value of the intensity are observed. There are three main sectors performing
research and development: Government, Higher Education and Business Enterprise.
The OECD National Account Statistics and Eurostat use the information of these
four sectors to calculate GERD for each country. Overviewing the data for di↵erent
sectors which are financing GERD, one can easily see that most of the R&Ds are
performed by the private sector (the business enterprise). The lowest budget spent
on research and development belong to higher education sector as predicted. The
average ratio of GERD financed by higher education for 11 OECD countries in the
period under the study, decreased 27.7% where the percentage of GERD funded by
governments decreased even more by the approximate rate of 33%. The percentage
of GERD financed by the private sector for all countries present an increasing trend
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for the period of 1984-2009. It is increased by the rate of 24%. To have a better view
on the improvement of R&D intensity relative to GDP growth and compare the ratio
of R&D funded by di↵erent sectors to total R&D, see Figures (1)-(3) in Appendix
V.
To test the e↵ect of R&D on the growth of total factor productivity the gross
domestic expenditure on R&D is chosen to include the total e↵ect of any spendings
on research and developments on growth. If R&D shows an empirically identified
e↵ect on TFP growth based on the model, one may conclude that the policy must
support any methods which generate more innovations i.e. government can directly
subsidise research activities, or it can be increased by motivating private and higher
education sectors to invest more on R&D. In this thesis, the focus is on the causal
relation between growth in TFP and R&D expenditures which is supposed to increase
innovations. R&D intensity as the ratio of GERD to GDP is not the product of
innovations but is an input to the machine of innovations. It is discussed in Chapter
2 that many empirical studies use the patent data as the output for the innovative
activities which seems a better proxy for knowledge productivity. The model outlined
in Chapter 3 does not have a representative firm with di↵erent sectors to take the
R&D input and generate the output. It is a simple model concentrated on the
household’s decision on choosing to do creative productivity-enhancing activities or
not; thus it is not necessary to use the patent proxy. As long as incentivising the
representative household to do innovations is the matter of concern, R&D intensity
can correctly proxy these activities.
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5.1.2 On Choice of not Filtering the Data
It is a common practice to filter the data before estimating a DSGE model. Since
Whittaker (1923), methods of graduating data which now is commonly called data
smoothing or data filtering are designed to remove the e↵ects of measurement error
and reveal the underlying trend in the data. Hodrick-Prescott (HP), Band-Pass and
Baxter-King filters are the standard techniques in macroeconomics for separating the
long-run trend in a data series from short-run fluctuations. Two well-cited papers in
which HP filter is applied are Kydland and Prescott (1990) and Backus and Kehoe
(1992). Following these two articles, HP filter used universally to stationarise data
despite the fact that there are criticisms to its properties (Cogley and Nason, 1995;
Ravn and Uhlig, 2002; Canova, 2008; and Phillips and Jin, 2015). It is widely
known that filtering the data, in general, may distort the dynamic properties of
the model in some way which are not easy to uncover. For example, Cogly and
Nason (1995) in their paper demonstrate that HP filter is likely to generate ‘spurious’
cyclical structure at business cycle frequencies in a case where it applied to di↵erence
stationary series. The similar defects are considered for Band-Pass and Baxter-King
filters which make them targets for major modifications if one wants to apply them
appropriately.
Following Meenagh et al. (2012), I decided to use raw data which are not filtered
using the conventional and frequently used HP, Band-Pass and Baxter-King filtering
method mostly for the reasons such as these methods (particularly HP-filter) alter
the lag dynamic structure of the data and make non-existent cycles or transform
the forward-looking properties of the DSGE model. Instead, all the quarterly data
are only seasonally adjusted using X12-ARIMA method and to preserve their real
121
business cycle fluctuation no filter applied. Hence, unfiltered data is used for all the
endogenous variables when solving, testing and estimating the model of Chapter 2
and trend-stationary exogenous variables are detrended.
There still exists the issue of non-stationary data generated by the model. This
could be either because the structure of the model generates non-stationarity i.e., by
making the state variables to be related to some pre-determined variables that are
dependent upon some accumulated shock, such as net foreign assets or the model con-
sider a non-stationary variable such as technology shock in the production function
(for the model outlined in Chapter 2 both of these two reasons are valid). To handle
these model generated non-stationary data, a VECM model as the auxiliary is chosen
where unobservable non-stationary variables such as technology shock are assumed
observable using the residuals of the data which can make it possible to have as many
cointegrating relations as endogenous variables hence any non-stationary residual is
treated as a legitimate cointegrating variable. More details on the solution method
with non-stationary data are discussed in (4.2.4).
5.2 Empirical Work
Recollecting equation 3.4-3.58, the theory represented by the model of Chapter 3 is
structured as following
lnAt = lnAt 1 +  1 ⇡0t 1 + ✏A,t (5.3)
⇡0t = ⇢⇡0 ⇡
0
t 1 + ✏⇡0,t (5.4)
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Thus the first approach is to test whether the null hypothesis of the model that
research activities drive the growth of TFP. In the case that the theory is supported
empirically the policy implications may be necessary to motivate the research activ-
ities to enhance the growth. As it implicitly mentioned the policy decisions alters
based on the characteristics of the economy including the direct government’s subsidy,
tax incentive policies or any other policies which encourage the sectors responsible
for research are required to act more on the matter.
d lnAt =  1 ⇡
0
t 1 + ✏A,t (5.5)
The main assumption is  1 > 0, and it is supported by theories discussed in
Chapter 2; hence it is assumed that the marginal impact of research activities is
positive. The choice of the value for  1 in this R&D driven growth theory is already
discussed in Chapter 2 and calibration section of Chapter 3. The conclusion was
that there is still debate about the actual value of the rate of return to research and
development in the empirical literature which allows a considerable freedom around
this choice. The chosen value for  1 = 0.29, which is an average estimated rate of
return to R&D for 11 countries under the study and it is consistent with the literature
(see, Wieser, 2005; Hall et al. 2009). In the following sections, I investigate whether
the % of GDP allocated to GERD (R&D intensity) play a role in causing productivity
growth, in addition to the other productivity growth determinants wrapped in errors.
5.2.1 Indirect Inference Baseline Calibration Test Result
The summary of calibrated parameters and the allocated symbols to them is given
in Table (5.3). Those parameters with * in front of them are going to be estimated
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in section (5.2.2).
Parameters Role in the model outlined in Chapter 3
↵ labour share in input
  quarterly discount factor
⌫, ⌫f home( foreign) bias in consumption
  * quarterly depreciation rate
✓ preference weight on Ct
⇢1 * CRRA coe cient for Ct
⇢2 CRRA coe cient for Lt
⌘1 * Marginal e↵ect of lagged capital stock on current capital demand (natural logs)
⌘2 * Marginal e↵ect of expected capital on current capital
⌘3 * Marginal e↵ect of output on current capital
⌘4 * Marginal e↵ect of the current real interest rate on current capital
Y¯
N¯X
** Average output- NX ratio
C¯
N¯X
** Average consumption- NX ratio
G¯
N¯X
** Average government spendings-NX ratio
K¯
N¯X
** Average capital-NX ratio
 1** Rate of Return to R&D
Table 5.3: Calibrated Parameters for RBC Model
* The parameters which are estimated in section (5.2.2). ** These values are calibrated
using the sample averages of 11 OECD countries (1981-2014)
Table (5.4) shows parameters, and long-run ratios held fixed throughout the inves-
tigations and Table (5.5) provides the starting calibration values for other parameters
of interest.
↵   ⌫, ⌫f ⇢2
C¯
N¯X
G¯
N¯X
K¯
N¯X
 1
0.7 0.97 0.5 1.0 6.15 .0.29 0.76 0.29
Table 5.4: Parameters and ratios held fixed
The stationary residuals of the structural equations take the AR(1) form, and the
related coe cients are estimated using the IV method discussed in (3.1.7). Consump-
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  ⇢1 ✓ ⌘1 ⌘2 ⌘3 ⌘4
0.025 1.20 0.5 0.5 0.475 0.025 0.25
Table 5.5: Starting calibration for other parameters
tion, labour demand, capital, the real wage are endogenous variables with stationary;
I(0), shocks, policy variable (R&D expenditures) is a stochastic exogenous variable
that is treated as stationary AR(1) process and TFP (Solow residual); At is the only
one with non-stationary shocks hence modelled as a unit root process. The estimated
AR(1) coe cients are presented in Table (5.6).
Country ✏c ✏n ✏k ✏w ✏⇡0
Austria 0.499 0.907 0.615 0.919 0.951
Canada 0.581 0.921 0.628 0.964 0.997
Denmark 0.402 0.924 0.632 0.933 0.9975
Finland 0.335 0.958 0.950 0.961 0.996
France 0.546 0.985 0.612 0.988 0.957
Germany 0.436 0.941 0.606 0.961 0.998
Japan 0.419 0.969 0.701 0.967 0.963
Netherlands 0.494 0.957 0.688 0.999 0.961
Norway 0.429 0.927 0.639 0.971 0.950
Sweden 0.069 0.929 0.073 0.978 0.984
UK 0.594 0.913 0.620 0.971 0.969
Table 5.6: AR(1) coe cients of the structural shocks to variables indicated by subscript
given the starting calibration. ⇡0 modelled as exogenous stationary AR(1) process.
The test results for this calibration are based on the auxiliary Panel VECM with
output and productivity as endogenous variables for each country. The choice of
VECM is due to the non-stationarity of the technology shock which may cause one
or more of the long-run structural equations to generate non-stationary shocks. As-
suming the cointegration according to the fact that it is not possible to test all
equations for the cointegration (it would be useful if one could test each equation
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for the existence of the cointegration), I chose PVARX approximating the auxiliary
model (see Chapter 4). PVARX in this study aims at identifying the R&D-driven
growth while allowing for the fixed e↵ects (i.e. country-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity in the levels of the variables). If country-specific time dummies are considered
in PVARX, the aggregate country-specific shocks to macro variables that may a↵ect
all countries at the same time can be captured.
To evaluate the R&D-driven RBC growth model of the study, a Panel VARX(1)
with a limited group of variables is preferred as a higher order of VARs or increased
number of variables will increase the ‘stringency’ of the overall test. However, if the
model is rejected by a PVARX(1), any attempt to proceed with the higher order of
PVAR will be unnecessary. Although it is theoretically accepted that a ‘true’ DSGE
model must survive the infinite order of PVAR, raising the lag order of it worsens
the fit to the data as it may increase the complexity of the captured behaviour of the
model (Minford, Meenagh, and Theodoridis; 2008). The general form of a PVARX(1)
is given as
Zit = fi +  1Zit 1 +  2xit +  iT + uit (5.6)
where fi is the individual-specific e↵ect (only fixed-e↵ect specification is consid-
ered); that captures the unobserved ability of each country.  i is the country specific
e↵ect over time and control the non-stationarity e↵ect of the endogenous variables1
denoted by Zit.  1 is the country-common coe cients for the stacked endogenous
variables of each country. Hence, no “dynamic-interdependencies” is assumed which
means that slope coe cients are the same for all cross-sections (Love and Zicchino,
1The time trend is the balanced growth path BGP for each country.
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2006). It is conceptually (not mathematically identical) closer to taking an average
of the slopes (cross-country homogeneity condition). This is the classical approach to
deal with the cross-section heterogeneity as the dynamic interdependency increases
the complexity of a VAR with more endogenous variables and time series which
would be an empirical issue.
 2 captures the e↵ect of exogenous macro variable (GERD intensity) and uit are
i.i.d shocks. Zit may be a VAR of 3,4 or 5 macro variables.
To illustrate what this approach implies, an example of PVARX(1) with two
endogenous variable, Yi,t, Ait and an exogenous variable ⇡0it is given as following:
0@Ait
yit
1A =
0@f1i
f2i
1A+
0@ 11  12  13  1i
 21  22  23  2i
1A
0BBBBBB@
Ait 1
yit 1
⇡0it
T
1CCCCCCA+
0@u1it
u2it
1A (5.7)
where t = 1, ..., T and i = 1, ..., N identify the time and country specifications respec-
tively. Note that the orthogonality condition is satisfied and E[Zituit] = E[fiuit] = 0.
The idea is to take the data and use ordinary least square to estimate the coe cients
on the balanced panel 2. Given the dimension of my panel with a 134-period time se-
2The stacking procedure for a chosen endogenous variable such as At will be as
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
A1t
A1t+1
...
A1T
A2t
...
ANT
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
=
 
f1 f2 ... fN
 
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 ... 0
1 0 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 1 ... 0
0 1 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
+ 11
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
A1t 1
A1t
...
A1T 1
A21t 1
...
ANT 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
+ 13
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
⇡01t
⇡01t+1
...
⇡01T
⇡02t
...
⇡0NT
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
+ 11
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 ... 0
2 0 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
T 0 ... 0
0 1 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... T
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
+
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
u1t
u1t+1
...
u1T
u2t
...
uNT
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
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ries and short cross section (11 countries), OLS panel VAR will be a consistent and
defendable estimator. By capturing the country-specific fixed e↵ect and the time
trends in the PVAR, only the dynamic remains (which was the purpose of including
constant and time trend). This is applied to both actual and model-generated simu-
lation for di↵erent combinations of VAR to get the Wald statistics discussed in 4.2.1
and 4.2.2. Table 5.7 shows the summary of the baseline calibration test results.
(1)* (2) (3) (4)
Included Endog. Y,A Y,A,N Y,A,K Y,A,w
Included Exog. ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1
Normalised MD(t-stat) 2.622* 5.087 4.418 4.171
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Included Endog. Y,A,C Y,A Y,A,w Y,A,C
Included Exog. ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1, b
f
t 1 ⇡0t 1,b
f
t 1 ⇡0t 1,b
f
t 1
Normalised MD(t-stat) 3.825 4.389 4.912 6.352
Table 5.7: Wald Test Results (Baseline Calibration): Alternative VECMs.
*Trend and constant are included in all alternative auxiliaries.
Table (5.7) implies massively rejections of the directed Wald test at 5% of sig-
nificance level for di↵erent combinations of panel VARs. The Mahalanobis Distance
measure shows test statistics higher than 1.64 which implies a rejection of the model,
in other words, the test results show the Wald percentile of 100. As it is discussed
earlier increasing the number of variables in the VECM’s combinations or raising the
order worsens the test results. The best MD statistic belongs to the case of the aux-
iliary with only output, productivity and exogenous policy variable confirms the fact
that increasing the number of parameters of the VAR depresses the Wald statistics
and increases its distance with the critical value of 1.64. A variance decomposition es-
tablished for the productivity growth generated by the R&D model. To conduct the
variance-decomposition, the shocks to the R&D intensity and AR(1) error of produc-
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tivity growth are simulated to see how much of the variation in productivity growth
is because of the shock to the R&D intensity and how much is due to the independent
productivity shock, eA. The idea is to see if the rate of return to R&D which is based
on the empirical facts has a significant e↵ect on the growth rate of output or it has
a negligible e↵ect where the latter implies the policy e↵ect is exogenous to the model.
Variation in Productivity Growth Variance Percentage of the Total
Total Variance 0.01324 -
Due to R&D shock ⇡0 0.00151 11.4%
Due to other shocks eA 0.0117 88.6%
Table 5.8: Variance decomposition for the initial calibration values
Table (5.8) presents the shares of the variation in growth due to the shock to
R&D intensity and innovation to the productivity growth. This is generated using
the mean of the variances for 11 countries of the study. The 11.4% value for the
proportion of variance due to the R&D shock to the system confirms the distinction
of the model of Chapter 3 from an exogenous model.
5.2.2 Indirect Inference Estimation Results
Due to the rejection of the baseline calibration model, those parameters of interest
whose changes will not contradict the micro-founded structure of the model is esti-
mated via ‘simulated annealing’ search algorithm. To ensure the alteration without
getting too far from the theory, the search is limited to the 45% either side of the
initial values of the coe cients. Recall that the primary objective of the simulated
annealing algorithm is not to find the magnitude of the e↵ects, but to see whether a
set of parameters in a controlled range can be found in which the size of the e↵ect of
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R&D is large enough, such that the R&D-driven growth model of Chapter 3 is not
rejected.
More than 200 sets of coe cients in a range of 45% either side of the initial cali-
bration value are found to plug in the model. When the process of bootstrapping the
model for each set of coe cients for each country is finished, the model-generated
data is compared to the actual data through the pane of the panel VAR and the
related Wald statistics are calculated to see which set of discovered coe cients is the
best fit for the model (generates the smallest Wald statistic). A panel VAR consists
of only productivity and R&D intensity as the initial attempt is used to see if it passes
the test or not. In a case of no-rejection to the model, more variables will be included.
  ⇢1 ✓ ⌘1 ⌘2 ⌘3 ⌘4
0.0143 1.156 0.492 0.507 0.492 0.0143 0.1904
Table 5.9: Wald Minimising Coe cients Values
Table (5.9) reports the discovered Wald minimising coe cients which survive the
Indirect Inference test. Also, the average implied AR(1) coe cients for the stochastic
processes are reported in Table (5.10). Assessed on output and productivity, the
normalised transformed Mahalanobis Distance statistic is 0.862 which means the
statistic falls within the 91st percentile of the Wald distribution. It is presented that
on the auxiliary model (1) and (3), the Wald statistic is within the non-rejection
area of the bootstrap distribution.
Some of the estimated coe cients moved significantly from the initial values; for
example, the capital depreciation decreased by 42.8%, the marginal e↵ect of the
output and current real interest rate on current capital declined by 42% and 24%
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✏c ✏n ✏k ✏w ✏⇡0
Average
11-OECD 0.4373 0.9396 0.6675 0.9643 0.9755
Table 5.10: AR(1) coe cients for the structural shocks after estimation
Average of the coe cients for 11-OECD Countries
(1)** (2) (3)** (4)
Included Endog. Y,A Y,A,N Y,A,K Y,A,w
Included Exog. ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1
Wald percentile 91.1** 98.33 94.81** 100
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Included Endog. Y,A,C Y,A Y,A,w Y,A,C
Included Exog. ⇡0t 1 ⇡0t 1, b
f
t 1 ⇡0t 1, b
f
t 1 ⇡0t 1, b
f
t 1
Wald percentile 100 100 100 100
Table 5.11: Wald Test Results (Estimation): Alternative VECMs.
Trend and constant are included in all alternative auxiliaries.
respectively. The changes in CRRA coe cient in the utility function for consump-
tion decreased only by less than 4% and the preference weight on consumption, ✓,
decreased just by 1.6%.
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.22653 0.10147 0.06572 0.13146 0.15748 0.07248 0.04934 0.02948 -
en 0.05837 0.04281 0.05535 0.07526 0.16088 0.07157 0.04277 0.04928 -
ek 0.03713 0.02892 0.05514 0.07243 0.15804 0.06685 0.02187 0.04160 -
ew 0.06956 0.04583 0.06128 0.07801 0.16117 0.07287 0.04566 0.04963 -
e⇡0 0.06226 0.04396 0.05748 0.07638 0.16094 0.07225 0.04609 0.04927 0.12281
eA 0.54616 0.73701 0.70502 0.56646 0.20149 0.64398 0.79426 0.78075 0.87719
Table 5.12: Variance Decomposition, R&D-driven Model
*Average across 11-OECD Countries.
A variance decomposition is calculated for the logarithm of A for which only the
R&D innovation and the independent productivity innovation are relevant and also
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for the rest of other endogenous variables. Calculating the var-decomposition values
for stationary shocks are di↵erent from the non-stationary one, hence to get the
results presented in Table (5.12), di↵erent approaches are applied. For stationary
consumption, labour, capital, wages shocks and also for exogenous AR(1) process of
policy variable, the average standard deviations of the shocks are determined and
the model is bootstrapped one by one for each of these shocks (holding the rest
of the shocks zero) separately for each country. For non-stationary productivity
shock, a column of shocks are considered, the model is simulated and a 1000 pseudo-
sample for each country is discovered, then the variances of the di↵erence between
the model-simulated data and the base-run for each variable due to the productivity
shock are calculated. Finally, an average across the 11-OECD countries is taken to
have more analytical understandings of the e↵ect of this shock across these assumed
small economies (see Appendix IV for the variance decomposition tables for each
country).
As it is expected on a non-stationary set up the non-stationary shock to dom-
inate the sample variance, the variance decomposition depicts that within-sample
variations in endogenous variables are due to the productivity shock components
and that the other shocks are more or less equally spread in e↵ect. We may still
believe in the model to be distinct from the exogenous growth model as in column
10 of Table (5.12) the 12.3% of the variation in total factor productivity is because
of the R&D intensity factor. I have to mention that the table of the variance decom-
position illustrates the average of the variations for the countries, by looking at the
variance decomposition tables for each country, one may conclude that each country
data set is responding di↵erently to some of the shocks and R&D’s role on changes
of variables di↵ers from one country to another.
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Looking back at the results of Table (5.11) and (5.12), the role of R&D in making
e↵ects in the transition of productivity can be concluded, although the magnitude of
the e↵ect is still the matter of concern. The inferential test used as a tool to evaluate
a simple open RBC model with R&D as the driver of productivity suggests the
model to be ‘true’ although restrictions are applied in a sense that the model’s micro
foundation may not be the most appropriate structure when one considers the e↵ect
of research and development on productivity. Even with all the assumptions and
restrictions due to the nature of the impact, the model shows acceptable outcomes.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, the open economy RBC model of growth outlined in Chapter 3 is
tested and estimated using the Indirect Inference method when the productivity is
driven endogenously by the expenditure on research and development across 11 de-
veloped countries in Europe. Before starting the engine of the test process, the data
descriptions and the main sources of them are introduced. To proxy the representa-
tive household’s innovative activities, the expenditure approach is chosen which is a
valid proxy for the time spending on innovation if these activities are compensated
by the subsidy, hence the share of gross expenditure on research and development
(GERD) in total GDP known as R&D intensity defined by Frascati Manual is cho-
sen to represent the household’s innovative activities. Both science and technology
indicators and aggregate economic indicators of the countries are for the period of
1981-2014.
Using the initial calibrated parameters, the model is tested via Indirect Inference
and the normalised Mahalanobis distance statistics for di↵erent choices of panel VAR
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are given where all indicate that the model is strongly rejected as these statistics fall
in the 100th percentile of the Wald distribution. Following the extensive rejection
of the model some calibrated parameters are estimated using ‘simulated annealing
algorithm” which searches within about 45% either side of the initial values to find
the best fit with minimum Wald statistics. The result of the chapter shows changes
in capital parameters and slightly changes in consumer preferences will drive the
model to present more appropriate Wald statistics and pass indirect inference Wald
test at 5% significant level implying that the R&D spendings lead to the productivity
growth during this period and for this sample of 11 countries. Although the e↵ect of
productivity may be di↵erent for each country but as average the magnitude of over
12% is predicted for the impact of research and development on productivity factor.
It can be noted that the hypothesis of R&D intensity driving productivity growth
survives the Indirect Inference test. However as the power of the test rises by the
increase in the number of endogenous variables to take part in the panel VAR, the
test fails. It would be interesting to do a power analysis for the test and see how the
range of possible falseness of the model and how any R&D policy e↵ects are altered
which will be a motive for the future work. The results of the chapter may also
suggest a more detailed and complex structured model to explain the ‘real’ e↵ect of
R&D channel on growth which can also be the material for future research. This
chapter undoubtedly presented a hard e↵ort to explain di↵erent aspects of a model
empirically with all related shortcomings and strengths.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The results of the empirical study achieved in Chapter 5 confirms the positive e↵ect
of research and development as the driver of TFP growth for the sample period. Con-
sistent with the argument of Gri th et al. (2004) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie (2001), the growth-enhancing influence of research and development
indicates the need for a sustainable activist policy for the OECD countries of the
sample.
By reviewing the existing empirical work on R&D-based growth models in Chap-
ter 2, it was concluded that the literature su↵ers from the defect of “unidentified”
regression defining the relationship between R&D and TFP growth hence there is not
enough research concentrated on the direction of the causality or a well-inferenced
structural model with identified reduced form relationships. The ambiguity in de-
termining the accurate correlation between growth and R&D was the main reason
motivated this research to adopt the method of Indirect Inference outlined in Chapter
4 to re-evaluate and estimate an identified R&D-driven dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model of growth depicted in Chapter 3 in which policy channel of R&D
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(if subsidy is to be considered) causes a permanent upward shift in productivity
followed by long-run growth episodes.
The “true” structural model is simulated using a bootstrapping technique, and
1000 pseudo samples are generated for 11-OECD countries. The simulated features of
the bootstrapped model are then summarised by the chosen auxiliary model of panel
VAR and compared to the features of the 11-OECD sample data. These captured
features discovered to be close in the statistical sense as the Wald statistics are small
enough for the impact not to be rejected. That is to say that the model-generated
data shows specifications which are close to the actual data thus the model has not
failed to explain the part of reality which is captured by the auxiliary model. For
the sample of chosen individuals, the research and development expenditure which is
decided to proxy the innovation in the workhorse DSGE model of Chapter 3, shows
a considerable e↵ect on the productivity growth episodes over the period for the
sample as through the pane of panel VAR, the di↵erence between the features of the
simulated data is close enough to reckon the model as the true one.
The variance decompositions are provided in Chapter 5 to show that the value
assigned to the marginal impact of innovation on productivity growth for the sample
period is large enough. They implied that the value for the e↵ect of R&D spendings
on TFP growth is acceptable in the sense that the model is far from being exogenous,
and it can comfortably be considered endogenously driven by R&D factor, but it
should be noted that the study is not focused on the accuracy of the magnitude of
the e↵ect due to the fact that this thesis is driven by the motivation to find the
sign of the e↵ect rather than the precise magnitude. The significant achievement
of this empirical work is that the strict and powerful method of Indirect Inference
does not reject the hypothesis of the positive growth-enhancing e↵ect of R&D (the
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ratio of expenditure on research and development GERD to GDP) and this result is
conclusive and defendable.
It should be noted that considering R&D intensity to represent innovation in the
model shows that this thesis did not try to specifically concentrate on evaluating
the policy implication which in that case instead of GERD proportion to GDP, the
extensively used BERD to government spendings ratio may have been chosen but
by some minimal changes in the model and selected proxy to characterise R&D, the
policy impact can be directly tested and evaluated. It is not di cult to conclude
from the results that R&D spendings being responsible for the positive changes in
productivity growth can drive policy makers to allocate resources to research or to
establish a system of policies to incentivise the innovative activities.
Believing in empiricism and the Popperian falsifiability feature of science, the
main purpose of this thesis was to empirically test a highly accepted theoretical spec-
ification that R&D is positively related to productivity growth of nations. A rather
simplified R&D-based endogenous growth model is chosen to signify the theoretical
aspect of the research, hence the further step for this research may be to extend
the model to explain more details of the actual world and to apply the procedure
discussed in Chapter 4 to alternative micro-founded macro models.
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Appendix I. The Choice of zt
To have a better understanding of representative agent’s behaviour in choosing the
amount of time spent on innovative activities, consider the firm’s problem in section
(3.1.2). The expected impact of zt on the firm’s production function at time (t+ 1)
is
@⇡t+1
@zt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
.
@At+1
@zt
+
@Yt+1
@Kt+1
.
@Kt+1
@zt
+
@Yt+1
@Nt+1
.
@Nt+1
@zt
(1)
  @Kt+1
@zt
(  + rt+1 + t+1 + at+1)  @Nt+1
@zt
(wt+1 +  t+1)
This equation presents that the choice of zt will change profit to the firm via a↵ecting
productivity, capital and also labour. Decomposing the relation further will give
@⇡t+1
@zt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
.
@At+1
@zt
+ (MPK + MPK).
@Kt+1
@zt
+ (MPN + MPN).
@Nt+1
@zt
(2)
  @Kt+1
@zt
(  + rt+1 + t+1 + at+1)  @Nt+1
@zt
(wt+1 +  t+1)
where MPK is the expected marginal product of capital at time t+ 1 assuming no
e↵ect coming from zt and  MPK is the expected increase in the marginal product
due to the marginal impact of zt and similar approach forMPN which is the expected
marginal product of labour with no marginal impact from zt and  MPN as the
di↵erence which choice of zt will make in labour. In the absence of any changes in zt
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MPK = (  + rt+1 + t+1 + at+1) (3)
MPN = wt+1 +  t+1 (4)
since the choice of zt has no e↵ect on the rents of capital and labour the equation
for the marginal e↵ect of zt on profit of the firm can be reduced to
@⇡t+1
@zt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
.
@At+1
@zt
+ MPK.
@Kt+1
@zt
+ MPN.
@Nt+1
@zt
(5)
On the RHS of equation (5), the second order terms can be ignored, hence it can be
assumed that the increase representative firm’s profit is only due to the higher pro-
ductivity. The world of the model outlined in Chapter 3, is the perfect competition
hence the profit of the firm will be zero after small changes in zt, meaning after a
small increase in the time of innovative activities, the dividend income ,⇡t+1 = dt+1
will be zero. One may question how the extra income enters the budget constraint.
This only happens through the increase in wages due to increase in productivity. To
summarise
@⇡t+1
@zt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
.
@At+1
@zt
(6)
=
@dt+1
@zt
as it is assumed the second order e↵ects on firms demand for labour and capital
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can be ignore, hence @Yt+1@At+1 =
Yt+1
At+1
and based on this assumption the marginal impact
of zt on the the firm’s profit ( or the dividends) is reduced to
@⇡t+1
@zt
=
Yt+1
At+1
.
@At+1
@zt
(7)
Appendix II. On Non-stationarity of CtYt
Recalling the representative consumer’s budget constraint from equation (3.9):
Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
+
bft+1
1 + rft
= wtNt + bt + b
f
t + dt (8)
where where dt = ⇧t = Yt  [Kt  (1   )Kt 1] wtNt is the profit of the firm which
is transferred to the consumer in the form of dividends. By substituting out wages
and dividends, budget constraint will be
Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
+
bft+1
1 + rft
= Yt   [Kt   (1   )Kt 1] + bt + bft (9)
based on the first order conditions for consumer problem, rt = r
f
t , hence it can easily
be assumed that
 
bt+1 + b
f
t+1 ⌘ b0t+1
 
and
 
bt + b
f
t ⌘ b0t
 
Ct +
b0t+1
1 + rt
= Y 0t + b
0
t (10)
where Y 0t = Yt [Kt (1  )Kt 1]. In expectational form the representative consumer
plan must satisfy the following constraint where there is an infinite forward recursion
in the value of the future bonds.
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b0t = Ct   Y 0t + Et
1X
i=0
hn iY
j=0
(1 + rt+j)
o 1 
Ct+i   Y 0t+i
 i
(11)
From the representative first order condition, one can derive
Ct =
1
 
Et
Ct+1
(1 + rt+1)
=
1
 2
Et
Ct+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
= ... (12)
hence,
Et
n iY
j=0
(1 + rt+j
o 1
Ct+i =  
iCt (13)
thus
Ct = (1   )
n
b0t + Y
0
t + Et
1X
i=0
hn iY
j=0
(1 + rt+j)
o 1
Y 0t+i
io
(14)
The term inside the bracket is the representative consumer’s disposable income hence
the whole RHS expression is permanent income
Ct = (1   )b0t + Y Pt (15)
at a terminal date like T , consumption, consumer’s permanent income and bonds
are growing at a constant rate of g.
CT = (1   )
n
b0T +
1X
i=0
n 1 + g
1 + r⇤
oi
[1 +
  
(r ⇤+ c) ]YT
o
(16)
= (1   )b0T + Y PT (17)
dividing both sides of equation (17) by Yt will give
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Ct
Yt
= (1   ) b
0
t
Yt
+
Y Pt
Yt
(18)
by using linear approximation equation (18) will be
ln
 Ct
Yt
 
= (share of household’s income from abroad).ln
  b0t
Yt
 
+ ln
 Y Pt
Yt
 
(19)
in steady state (
b0t
Yt
) will tend to some steady level because of representative con-
sumer’s behaviour and expectations. In a meantime (
b0t
Yt
) is driven by a di↵erence
equation of the form
xt+1 = (1 + qt) + xt + "t (20)
where qt considers the growth rate in debts and can have positive or negative sign.
With "t moving randomly between steady states, xt =
b0t
Yt
will have an explosive
randomly distributed behaviour (unit root). Therefore with
b0t
Yt
being non-stationary
one can conclude a non-stationary property for ln(
Ct
Yt
).
I also tested the unit-root test for ln(
Ct
Yt
) using Augmented Dicky Fuller, and
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) for all 11-OECD countries under the
study. Without any exception, the non-stationarity is confirmed. Simulation gener-
ated series also present a random walk behaviour, thus, the random walk assumption
for ln(
Ct
Yt
) is defendable.
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Appendix III. Steady State and Terminal Conditions
System of equations after log-linearisation and substitution of calibrated parameters
is as
Ct = EtCt+1 + 0.83[ln (
1
0.97
)  rt] (21)
Yt = 0.7Nt + 0.3Kt (22)
Nt =  0.3566749 + Yt   wt (23)
Kt = 0.5Kt 1 + 0.475Kt+1 + 0.025[ 1.6094 + Yt   10rt] (24)
wt = 1.2Ct   0.69314718 +Nt (25)
bt = (1 + r
f
t )bt 1 +NXt (26)
NXt = Yt   8
1.3
[Kt  Kt 1]  0.381
1.3
(27)
Gt   1
1.3
Ct (28)
Gt =  1.203972804 + Yt (29)
at T , KT = YT (plus constant which drops out). To find the steady state’s parame-
ters I tried:
K = Y
C = 1.3B + 1.3Y   0.381G
G = Y
w = 1.2C +N
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Y = 0.7N + 0.3K + A
N = Y   w
and the solution for the steady state is
C = 1. 248 7A+ 0.618 22B (30)
G = 1. 358 7A  0.741 87B (31)
K = 1. 358 7A  0.741 87B (32)
N =  6. 983 9⇥ 10 2A  0.741 87B (33)
Y = 1. 358 7A  0.741 87B (34)
w = 1. 428 6A (35)
B is equal to rft bt, and all the constant has been excluded. Hence, by using steady
state calculated above,the terminal conditions for the Fortran program are provided;
equation (30), equation (34) and the condition where (K = Y ).
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Appendix IV. Variance Decomposition Table for Countries
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.74000 0.65050 0.16954 0.59265 0.19806 0.16825 0.00976 0.01260 -
en 0.00000 0.00095 0.00017 0.00387 0.19302 0.16068 0.00020 0.00001 -
ek 0.00000 0.00076 0.00004 0.00390 0.19303 0.16068 0.00005 0.00001 -
ew 0.00000 0.00181 0.00032 0.00487 0.19304 0.16069 0.00006 0.00006 -
e⇡0 0.00000 0.00077 0.00004 0.00390 0.19301 0.16068 0.00005 0.00001 0.13959
eA 0.26000 0.34520 0.82989 0.39082 0.02985 0.18903 0.98988 0.98729 0.86041
Table 1: Variance Decomposition, Austria
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.00191 0.00685 0.16968 0.01587 0.16144 0.03501 0.00496 0.00975 -
en 0.00150 0.00716 0.170 0.01635 0.16369 0.03528 0.00482 0.01290 -
ek 0.00140 0.00727 0.17010 0.01763 0.16268 0.03537 0.00483 0.01301 -
ew 0.00156 0.00757 0.17029 0.01662 0.16427 0.03562 0.00482 0.01213 -
e⇡0 0.00151 0.00707 0.16995 0.01616 0.16359 0.03520 0.00483 0.01266 0.20824
eA 0.99213 0.96408 0.14997 0.91736 0.18434 0.82353 0.97573 0.93955 0.79176
Table 2: Variance Decomposition, Canada
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.03349 0.00081 0.00155 0.07690 0.10805 0.01613 0.00117 0.00062 -
en 0.03354 0.00082 0.00155 0.07692 0.10806 0.01614 0.00118 0.00063 -
ek 0.03346 0.00082 0.00159 0.07685 0.10790 0.01614 0.00119 0.00063 -
ew 0.03369 0.00085 0.00157 0.07697 0.10807 0.01617 0.00125 0.00062 -
e⇡0 0.03361 0.00083 0.00155 0.07694 0.10807 0.01616 0.00125 0.00063 0.02500
eA 0.83220 0.99588 0.99219 0.61541 0.45985 0.91925 0.99397 0.99686 0.97500
Table 3: Variance Decomposition, Denmark
one standard deviation shock
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C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.98662 0.02428 0.03617 0.11773 0.13194 0.03041 0.02525 0.01291 -
en 0.00237 0.02330 0.02338 0.12586 0.14790 0.02947 0.02239 0.04037 -
ek 0.00851 0.02269 0.02391 0.13379 0.14154 0.02889 0.02127 0.04166 -
ew 0.00038 0.02380 0.02474 0.12495 0.14786 0.02996 0.02259 0.03913 -
e⇡0 0.00211 0.02322 0.02351 0.12501 0.14784 0.02939 0.02264 0.03999 0.12412
eA 0.00000 0.88271 0.86828 0.37265 0.28292 0.85187 0.88585 0.82594 0.87588
Table 4: Variance Decomposition, Finland
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.00987 0.00577 0.00254 0.01824 0.18399 0.02573 0.00725 0.00805 -
en 0.00854 0.00601 0.00403 0.01856 0.18476 0.02594 0.00650 0.00769 -
ek 0.00833 0.00601 0.00457 0.01788 0.18361 0.02594 0.00678 0.00770 -
ew 0.01101 0.00666 0.00505 0.02002 0.18514 0.02653 0.00721 0.00926 -
e⇡0 0.00937 0.00609 0.00390 0.01895 0.18468 0.02602 0.00720 0.00780 0.20374
eA 0.95287 0.96946 0.97991 0.90635 0.07783 0.86985 0.96506 0.95951 0.79626
Table 5: Variance Decomposition, France
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.23825 0.00510 0.00521 0.19907 0.12319 0.05645 0.01198 0.00032 -
en 0.18359 0.00526 0.00541 0.17320 0.12790 0.05657 0.01033 0.00472 -
ek 0.18249 0.00538 0.00553 0.18026 0.12759 0.05666 0.01055 0.00474 -
ew 0.20929 0.00587 0.00597 0.18708 0.12834 0.05702 0.01068 0.00475 -
e⇡0 0.18637 0.00526 0.00516 0.17378 0.12791 0.05657 0.01079 0.00463 0.12305
eA 0.00000 0.97314 0.97273 0.08661 0.36508 0.71674 0.94567 0.98084 0.87695
Table 6: Variance Decomposition, Germany
one standard deviation shock
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C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.27899 0.20282 0.16768 0.19299 0.19941 0.20044 0.23448 0.18741 -
en 0.19682 0.08701 0.20363 0.17898 0.20264 0.10675 0.15254 0.10430 -
ek 0.05928 0.14004 0.18150 0.19892 0.09814 0.09488 0.09527 0.17157 -
ew 0.02041 0.09650 0.22113 0.20502 0.10953 0.20391 0.16306 0.10494 -
e⇡0 0.21089 0.21704 0.20807 0.20179 0.20279 0.10702 0.16137 0.10307 0.11467
eA 0.23361 0.25660 0.01800 0.02230 0.18749 0.28700 0.19328 0.32871 0.88533
Table 7: Variance Decomposition, Japan
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.19975 0.21659 0.16416 0.22723 0.19344 0.20859 0.24568 0.07420 -
en 0.21293 0.20854 0.19446 0.20389 0.20441 0.20442 0.20573 0.24117 -
ek 0.11135 0.13092 0.19427 0.14790 0.19125 0.16422 0.09750 0.19802 -
ew 0.25158 0.22886 0.23745 0.21399 0.20599 0.21495 0.22566 0.24545 -
e⇡0 0.22439 0.21509 0.20966 0.20699 0.20492 0.20781 0.22542 0.24116 0.037
eA 0.00000 0.0011 0.00023 0.00014 0.0007 0.000254 0.000101 0.00136 0.962
Table 8: Variance Decomposition, Netherlands
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.00032 0.00001 0.00008 0.00004 0.09673 0.01732 0.00001 0.000071 -
en 0.00113 0.00018 0.00019 0.00267 0.09960 0.01747 0.00020 0.00013 -
ek 0.00184 0.00108 0.00089 0.01413 0.10273 0.01830 0.00124 0.00031 -
ew 0.00216 0.00022 0.00021 0.00323 0.09932 0.01751 0.00038 0.00009 -
e⇡0 0.00156 0.00025 0.00030 0.00308 0.09948 0.01754 0.00033 0.00011 0.19992
eA 0.99299 0.99825 0.99833 0.97686 0.50214 0.91186 0.99785 0.99930 0.80008
Table 9: Variance Decomposition, Norway
one standard deviation shock
171
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.00122 0 .00340 0.00544 0.00526 0.15404 0.00577 0.00221 0.01823 -
en 0.00065 0.00330 0.00497 0.00530 0.15564 0.00567 0.00207 0.02053 -
ek 0.00062 0.00296 0.00465 0.00524 0.15413 0.00533 0.00193 0.01988 -
ew 0.00065 0.00358 0.00613 0.00530 0.15555 0.00595 0.00211 0.01988 -
e⇡0 0.00066 0.00335 0.00522 0.00529 0.15557 0.00571 0.00219 0.02029 0.08060
eA 0.99620 0.98341 0.97358 0.97362 0.22508 0.97158 0.98948 0.90119 0.91940
Table 10: Variance Decomposition, Sweden
one standard deviation shock
C Y N K NX G w bf A
ec 0.00141 0.00006 0.00089 0.00002 0.18207 0.03321 0.00001 0.00006 -
en 0.00097 0.00007 0.00109 0.00003 0.18205 0.03322 0.00006 0.00003 -
ek 0.00110 0.00013 0.00154 0.00018 0.18209 0.03327 0.00001 0.00006 -
ew 0.00084 0.00009 0.00122 0.00006 0.18207 0.03323 0.00001 0.00003 -
e⇡0 0.01433 0.00464 0.00493 0.00832 0.18243 0.03703 0.00651 0.00208 0.09395
eA 0.98135 0.99502 0.99033 0.99139 0.08929 0.83005 0.99339 0.99774 0.90605
Table 11: Variance Decomposition, UK
one standard deviation shock
Appendix V. Graphs for GERD
A. Indicators on R&D expenditures, budgets and personnel are derived from the
OECD’s Research and Development Statistics (RDS) database, which is based on the
data reported to OECD and Eurostat in the framework of the joint OECD/Eurostat
international data collection on resources devoted to R&D where Eurostat?s statistics
on R&D expenditure are compiled using guidelines laid out in the Frascati manual,
published in 2002 by the OECD.
B. The main analysis of R&D is by four sectors of performance: 1) Government
sector, 2) Higher Education sector, 3) Business Enterprise Sector, and 4) Private
non-Profit Sector. Based on Eurostat, Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD)
is composed of expenditure from each of these four sectors.
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Figure 1: Annual GDP per capita growth and gross domestic
expenditure on R&D as the percentage of GDP (1981-2014)
Source of the data: OECD iLibrary.
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Figure 2: Number of researchers in government, higher education and business sectors
as the ratio of the total number of researchers in each country (1981-2014).
Source: OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics.
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Figure 3: percentage of gross domestic expenditure R&D financed by di↵erent sectors
Source: OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics.
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